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One of the challenges faced by a journal serving a specialized audience,like judges, is to balance general-interest articles with ones on a sin-gle topic.  Some topics  are of sufficient significance, though, that we
will devote most or all of an issue of Court Review to that topic.  When we do
this, we work hard to find authors who are in the forefront of work in that area.
For this issue on jury reform, we think you’ll be pleased with the result.   The
authors who have contributed to this issue are unquestionably among the top
experts in the field.
In the first article, Greg Mize and Chris Connelly provide an overview of
jury reform in the United States today.  They include information on a national
program now underway to increase use of effective jury reform methods.  Mize
cochaired the District of Columbia Jury Project
from 1996-1998 and remains active today in
the jury reform movement.   
Our second article, by Mike Dann and
Valerie Hans, reviews the most recent empirical
evaluations of several jury trial innovations,
including note taking, questions from jurors,
preliminary substantive instructions, and juror
discussions of evidence during trial.  Dann
chaired the Arizona Jury Trial Reform
Committee in 1993; Hans has written two
books and numerous articles on juries and jury
reform.
Our third article, by Shari Seidman
Diamond, Mary Rose, and Beth Murphy, reviews the practice of letting jurors
ask questions during trial.  They focus on an in-depth look at a single question:
what are the effects when jurors are allowed to ask questions, but the judge
doesn’t ask one of the questions submitted?  These researchers were able to
observe unanswered questions in 39 jury trials.  They provide an excellent
overall review of the value of letting jurors ask questions and whether any neg-
ative effects arise when that is done.  Seidman Diamond is one of the leading
experts on juries, with dozens of published articles.  Rose has conducted
empirical research on juries for many years.  And Murphy has been previously
published in Court Review on ways to improve jury deliberations.
We appreciate the effort of each of these authors in making this a special and
valuable issue.  We also acknowledge the help of Paula Hannaford-Agor at the
National Center for State Courts in helping to recruit some of the authors; and
of Greg Mize and Shari Seidman Diamond in making suggestions for the
Resource Page: Focus on Jury Reform on page 42.
As always, we hope you’ll take a moment while reading the issue to look at
the Resource Page section, which starts on page 44.  And, as you come across
information that you believe might be appropriately listed on the Resource
Page or otherwise of interest to other judges, please let us know.—SL 
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
26 of the Summer 2003 issue.  Court Review reserves the
right to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for
publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkinsphoto
@earthlink.net).  The cover photo is of the Cape May
County Courthouse in Cape May Court House,  New
Jersey.
© 2004, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-4147.  Points of view or
opinions expressed in Court Review are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of
the National Center for State Courts or the American
Judges Association.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
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My travels this year have given me the opportunity to spread
the word about the benefits of AJA membership. My message
has been simple: Every judge needs to belong to a national
judges’ organization that represents all judges, not just a nar-
row section or division of judges and not just a bar association
with a small minority of judge members. Those kinds of orga-
nizations have a role to play, but they can’t speak beyond their
narrow focus or with one voice. The AJA can do both. 
The reception I’ve received to this message has been positive
but we, as an organization, need to do more. Toward that end,
last spring our Executive Committee voted to suspend indefi-
nitely the first-year-free membership that we had offered for
many years and replace it with a new “Member-Get-
a-Member” campaign. The details of this program
have been sent to you in the mail and in Benchmark.
The point I want to make here is simply that all of us
can spread the word about the benefits of AJA mem-
bership as we attend our local and state judicial con-
ferences and as we communicate with our judicial
colleagues on a daily basis. You, as an AJA member,
are the best ambassador we have. 
The AJA has a critical role to play in the coming national
battles over judicial independence, selection and retention of
judges, and salaries and benefits for judges. These issues are
critical to the future independence of our courts. But that role
is diminished if our numbers are declining. Membership in a
state association is vital, but I’ve learned in my year as your AJA
president that judges have key national allies with which state
judicial organizations may not have open lines of communica-
tion. I’ve also discovered that attacks on the courts take famil-
iar forms, whether in different states or even in Canada.
Therefore, a national judicial organization is needed to educate
the public and media about the necessity for an independent
judiciary. Toward this end, the AJA sought and obtained a grant
from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago to put on the National
Forum on Judicial Independence at our annual conference in
San Francisco.  
AJA involvement in substantive national issues must con-
tinue. In the past year, I appointed Judge Leo Bowman of
Michigan to serve on the joint committee of CCJ/COSCA deal-
ing with problem-solving courts. He also served as the AJA rep-
resentative on “A National Survey of the Court’s Capacity to
Provide Protection Orders” established by the National
Institute of Justice. Judge Lynda Howell of Arizona and I par-
ticipated in an expert panel on “The Judge’s Role in the
Reduction of Impaired Driving,” an ongoing educational pro-
ject funded by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and administered by the National Center for
State Courts. Your next AJA president, Judge Gayle Nachtigal of
Oregon, has developed a program of education for presiding
judges and those who aspire to such administrative judicial
positions, which is scheduled for our next annual conference.
These initiatives put the AJA “brand” name on
important educational efforts to train judges and
court personnel.
When I became AJA president last year, I
expressed as a goal the need to continue the AJA’s
tradition of providing solid educational programs
at our annual and midyear conferences, along with
strong social events at each to facilitate the meeting
and making of friends and colleagues from across
the nation. I also wanted to strengthen our ties with other
judicial organizations. Our joint midyear meeting in Savannah
with the National Association for Court Management (NACM)
was a success in all three respects. NACM put on an excellent
educational program that had relevance to judges, court
administrators, and clerks. The joint nature of the meeting
made it possible for AJA members to share concerns of com-
mon interest with the members of NACM. And, of course, the
social program was top notch, particularly the fabulous Super
Bowl party. This is just an example of the kind of partnership
the AJA can benefit from with other national judicial organi-
zations.
This past year has been exciting and exhausting. I wouldn’t
have missed it for anything. I thank all AJA members for your
good wishes and your wise counsel. I thank the scores of judges
who volunteered their time and energy to make this year a suc-
cessful one. Your involvement and support of the AJA and its
many important activities is the indispensable ingredient for its
continued success. 
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Footnotes
1. Trial by Jury: Reforms Are Needed to Stabilize the Pool,  COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Sept. 6, 1999, at 8A.
2. G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, PAULA L. HANNAFORD & G. MARC
WHITEHEAD, JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 1 (1997).  
Recently the United States Supreme Court has instructedus that any contested fact, other than a prior conviction,that increases the penalty for a crime must be deter-
mined by a jury.  In addition, the highest court for the
Commonwealth of Virginia has determined that, in capital
cases, a claimed defense of mental retardation raises a jury
question.  Whether it is a case prompted by these high court
rulings, one of the many accounting fraud prosecutions in
New York, or scientific evidence presented in a products liabil-
ity action in the Midwest, the American jury is repeatedly
being called upon to make findings in new and complex mat-
ters.  Unfortunately it is common for jurors to perform these
weighty tasks in unfit conditions and without the learning
tools that we take for granted in school.   While computers and
interactive technology are becoming commonplace in our
classrooms, juror note-taking and questioning of expert wit-
nesses have customarily been discouraged in courtrooms.
Moreover, despite the wellspring of pride in our democratic
ideals after September 11, 2001, corrosive myths and misgiv-
ings about the jury trial still abound.  In this regard we need
only reflect upon several notorious jury verdicts in the 1990s.
Laymen and litigators, who fix upon those cases, think juries
too often get it wrong.  In addition, there is the recently recur-
ring diminishment of governmental funding for trial courts and
widespread citizen reluctance to respond to summonses for
jury duty.  For example, in many large, urban court systems, the
response rate to jury summoning is about 20%.  Is it any won-
der that citizens are dodging jury service in record numbers?  
There is good news, though.  A growing number of courts
are taking steps to perform at a higher level with respect to jury
trials.  As shown below, a movement started in Arizona has
taken hold in a growing number of states.  Creative court
administrators, courageous judges, and inspired bar leaders are
joining together to bring our cherished institution of trial by
jury into the 21st century.  Articles included in this issue of
Court Review show how members of the legal academy are test-
ing and demonstrating the dynamics of jury trial innovations
that are founded on principles long recognized by the social
sciences and business communities.  Indeed, as described in
this article, there now exists a National Program to Increase
Citizen Participation in Jury Service Through Jury
Innovations.  Before long, there will be an encyclopedic collec-
tion of uniform data called the “State of the States” that will tell
us how every state operates each aspect of its jury trial systems.
Importantly, the State of the States will provide court leaders
with information about how to contact persons in other parts
of the country who have undertaken and implemented suc-
cessful jury trial innovations.  
THE RECENT HISTORY OF JURY TRIAL INNOVATION
EFFORTS
On September 6, 1999, the Columbus Dispatch reported on
an alarming occurrence in Ohio.  The column asked the
pointed question, “What is being done to get a prospective
juror to respond affirmatively to a summons?”  While most
people may believe this to be a non-issue, the article went on
to detail the story of Lucinda Whiting, whose arson case could
not begin for one simple reason: only 11 jurors could be found
to sit for her case after the conclusion of voir dire.  The quoted
words of the judge to the jurors who arrived in the courtroom
were: “This is important, and maybe it’s because some of your
fellow citizens did not recognize how important this was that
you and I spent the day here and accomplished nothing.’’1
The reported example raises the issue: how do we ensure
that jurors report for service?  For many states, a solution has
been to look toward innovations in their jury systems to make
the process work more effectively, efficiently, and conveniently
for citizens and legal professionals alike.  These efforts have
been multifaceted, ranging from reforms that seek to increase
juror comprehension of evidence and testimony to those that
provide greater compensation for service.
Serious discussions about jury trial innovation got under-
way in the early 1990s with the 1992 publication of Charting a
Future for the Civil Jury System by the Brookings Institution.
This paper reported the results of a symposium held in
Charlottesville, Virginia, in the same year.  The three-day con-
ference, organized by Brookings and the Section of Litigation
of the American Bar Association, “developed recommenda-
tions to improve civil jury procedures based both on their
unique perspectives and on the findings of commissioned
papers that were presented at the conference.”2 The gathering
marked what some have considered the birth of organized jury
trial innovations.  Because such endeavors in innovation ulti-
mately reside in the hands of affected jurisdictions, we must
look at the innovative practices within the states.  To this end,
eyes must first turn to Arizona.  
The Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective
Use of Juries began working on its system in 1993.  The com-
mittee, chaired by Judge B. Michael Dann, advocated changing
procedures to make the trial an educational process for jurors
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3. ARIZ. S. CT. COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE
POWER OF 12 (1994), available at http://www.supreme.
state.az.us/jury/Jury/jury.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).  
4. See, e.g., Paula Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans, & G. Thomas
Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of
the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 359 (2000); Junda
Woo, Arizona Panel Suggests Package of Reforms to Empower
Juries, WALL ST. J., October 25, 1994, at B1; Jeff Barge, Reformers
Target Jury Lists, A.B.A.J. , Jan. 1995, at 26;  Abraham Abramovsky
& Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An
Unnecessary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865.
(1996).
5. See Jury Reform ’95: Challenges and Changes, Ariz. S. Ct. Educ.
Svcs. (Nov. 1995).
6. PAULA HANNAFORD & G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, MASSACHUSETTS
PROJECT ON INNOVATIVE JURY TRIAL PRACTICES: FINAL REPORT (2002).  
7. Id.
8. Id.
and to give jurors a more active voice in the proceedings.3 The
Arizona Supreme Court eventually approved numerous reforms,
including granting jurors in civil trials the opportunity to dis-
cuss evidence among themselves before final deliberations.  This
was an effort to improve comprehension, especially in complex
proceedings.  Arizona was the first state in the country to adopt
this and many other juror-empowering policies. 
Arizona continued to demonstrate leadership on jury trial
issues throughout the 1990s.  Many of those efforts have been
studied and reported in professional publications.4 The banner
issues raised in Arizona include improvements in judicial com-
munications with jurors during trial, jury note taking, juror
questions to witnesses, and increasing responsiveness to the
needs of deliberating juries.5 What followed was a multitude
of similar efforts across the country.
To date, research indicates that 30 states have undertaken
formal steps to analyze their jury trial systems and establish
some innovations.  These efforts have included state-organized
commissions, jury innovation conferences, and written reports
and studies.  In general, most states’ efforts follow a “top-down”
format.  In these instances, the judiciary creates a statewide ini-
tiative dedicated to jury innovation efforts.  The initiative often
produces recommendations leading to varying degrees of
implementation, as state rules and procedures are altered
accordingly.  However, there have also been “bottom-up” jury
innovation efforts.  “Bottom-up” innovation can be considered
more of a grassroots movement, in which some trial judges
introduce innovative procedures in their own courtrooms,
without instruction or recommendation from a central hub.
Although rarer, “bottom-up” innovation efforts put new pro-
grams into practice more immediately.  Not surprisingly, they
can have narrower impact and be more difficult to study.
One noteworthy way some states have generated improve-
ments is the use of pilot programs.  Under this methodology, a
statewide commission commonly enlists the support of volun-
teer judges to test certain practices in their courtrooms.  The
volunteers report back to the commission about the effective-
ness of the innovations before they are instituted on a
statewide basis.  In other words, this is a combination of the
“top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches.  The states that have
followed this procedure have been able to obtain very useful
information about the effect of jury innovations.  For a taste of
these benefits, we look to Massachusetts, Colorado, New
Jersey, Hawaii, and the Columbus Dispatch’s home state of Ohio.
In November 1997, Massachusetts hosted a conference on
jury trial innovations, during which judges from the trial
courts met to hear presentations on jury innovations.  The
two-day conference led to 16 judges’ participation in a two-
year demonstration study, during which they introduced the
reforms discussed at the conference into their own court-
rooms.  It is important to note that this effort was not orga-
nized by the state administration—it was a grass-roots reform
effort that brought together likeminded individuals concerned
with reforming the jury system.  Sixteen innovations were
tested, including juror note-taking, juror questions to wit-
nesses, “plain English” jury instructions, pre-instructing the
jury on the law, post-verdict meetings between jurors and the
judge, and others.6 Judges and jurors were both asked to give
their opinions of these reforms.7 Questionnaires were col-
lected from judges and jurors in 150 cases, 66% of which
came from criminal trials.  Responses were received from
1,264 jurors.
These innovations were tested with varying frequency.  For
example, juror note-taking was tested in 95% of the trials in
which surveys were returned, whereas permitting jurors to
submit questions to witnesses was tested in 41% of the cases.
Judges overwhelmingly recommended certain innovations,
including note-taking, pre-instruction on the law, and post-
verdict meetings between judges and jurors.  With respect to
imposing time limits on parties’ time at trial and providing
written copies of instructions to the jury, there was little nega-
tive feedback about the effectiveness of these methods in
improving the jury process.  Some judges recommended every
innovation that they tested.  One commented that “[a]ll of the
practices used in the project seem to involve the jury more
actively in the learning process necessary to a rational deci-
sion.  Jurors in my experience have reacted very favorably to
the practices.  I have found virtually no drawbacks in or con-
traindications to using these practices.”8
Since the completion of the Massachusetts pilot project,
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9. Bryant jury may submit questions to witnesses, Associated Press,
June 16, 2004, available at http://www.katv.com/news/sto-
ries/0604/153729.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).  
10. Colorado Jury Reform Implementation Committee,
Implementation Plan: Jury Reform in Colorado (March 12, 1998),
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/
juryreformdocs/98_jury_imp.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
11. Id. at 1-4.
12. MARY DODGE, SHOULD JURORS ASK QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES? A
REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT’S JURY SYSTEM
COMMITTEE (Fall 2002), available at http://www.courts.state.
co.us/supct/committees/juryreformdocs/dodgereport.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 29, 2004).
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id. at 580.
15. AOC State of New Jersey Jury Subcommittee, Report on Pilot
Project Allowing Juror Questions, Available at: http://www.
judiciary.state.nj.us/jurypilot/jurypilot.htm
innovative procedures have been fine-tuned by way of bar CLE
programs and judicial conferences.
While programs in Massachusetts may have gone largely
unnoticed by the national media, it has been hard to miss the
attention given to Colorado’s jury reform projects due to the
trial of a certain basketball superstar.  The Kobe Bryant sexual
assault case drew attention to the new criminal trial procedure
in Colorado that enables jurors to ask witnesses written ques-
tions.  “When Kobe Bryant goes on trial later this year,”
according to an Associated Press story, “jurors will be allowed
to submit questions for witnesses in the sexual assault case in
what is believed to be the first rule of its kind.”9 Though the
national media has focused on juror questions to witnesses, it
is simply one reform that has resulted from Colorado’s innova-
tion efforts.
The reform effort resulting in juror questions at criminal tri-
als was the result of a long history of jury reform recommen-
dations in Colorado, beginning with the adoption of reforms
suggested in the February 1997 report, “With Respect to the
Jury: A Proposal for Jury Reform.”  After the Colorado
Supreme Court “adopted in principle the recommendations”
contained in this report, the chief justice “appointed a Jury
Reform Implementation Committee . . . and charged that com-
mittee with developing specific proposals to implement the
various recommendations in this Report, and reporting back to
the Court.”10 In 1998, the Committee reported back, subdi-
viding their recommendations into seven areas relevant to dif-
ferent areas of possible improvements, including reworking
Colorado’s jury instructions, statutory revisions to clarify rules
and procedures, and administrative changes such as public
education, revision of the master juror list, addressing the need
for juror debriefing, and standards for excusing jurors.
Additionally, they recommended commencement of pilot pro-
grams to test the success of various innovations, specifically
relating to pre-deliberation discussion among jurors in civil
cases, and the now famous reform regarding juror questions in
criminal cases.11
The juror questions pilot program was the first to be com-
pleted, resulting in the 61-page “Dodge Report” in Fall 2002.12
The report conveyed results and recommendations relating to
“the presence or absence of allowing jurors to submit ques-
tions . . . randomly assigned to 239 District and County Court
criminal trials.”  The study began in September 2000 when
Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey “authorized a statewide pilot
study to evaluate the effects of permitting jurors to submit
written questions during criminal trials.”13 The study obtained
feedback from judges, attorneys, and jurors by means of post-
trial questionnaires.  Juror questions were permitted in 118 tri-
als, while not permitted in 121. Surveys were collected from
both samplings.  The resulting data included the reasons jurors
asked questions and assessments by judges and attorneys
about the quality of the juror questions.  Findings were over-
whelmingly in favor of the innovation, with 93% of the jurors
surveyed reporting that it should be allowed in future trials.
Ultimately, the report supported questioning with judicial
supervision, stating that it “will have positive effects with few
detrimental results.”14
Similarly, New Jersey has focused its efforts on juror
inquiries to witnesses.  But unlike Colorado, their emphasis
has been on juror questions in civil trials.  In 1998, a pilot pro-
gram to investigate this innovation in civil trials was approved
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, though it did not begin
until nearly two years later.  From January 2000 through June
2000, 11 judges were commissioned to allow jurors to pose
written questions to witnesses.  The effort was chaired by
Judge Barbara Byrd Wecker.  It covered 147 civil trials, from
which surveys were obtained from attorneys, judges, and
jurors.  New Jersey based parts of their effort on the
Massachusetts program, using it to build their own testing
ground for the use of juror questions in civil cases.  As with the
Massachusetts study, the results showed that “it was apparent
that jurors and judges were reacting very favorably, whereas
attorney reaction was mixed . . . .  [T]he jurors virtually all
loved it . . . .  [T]he judges . . . were very pleased . . . [and] the
attorneys’ responses were measured.”15 The pilot recom-
mended that the state adapt their rules to allow juror questions
accordingly.
Following the completion of this pilot, the New Jersey
Supreme Court approved the pilot’s recommended changes,
and the revisions went into effect on September 3, 2002.  In
addition to adopting these rules, the Conference of Civil
Presiding Judges initiated a follow-up project to focus on the
specific procedures that judges may use when allowing jurors
to ask questions.  Chaired by Judge Maurice Gallipoli, the goal
of this ongoing project is to perfect the process of question ask-
ing.   The areas of inquiry include whether judges modify ques-
tions, whether attorneys ask follow-up questions of witnesses,
and how much additional trial time is required for the
allowance of questions.  The inquiry period lasted six months
and involved surveys of both judges and juries.  “The jury is
still out” regarding the results of this study.  The findings of the
project are expected to be completed in the fall of 2004.
Though Colorado and New Jersey have focused largely on
the field of juror questions, Hawaii has taken the idea of pilot
programs further.  On June 22, 1993, the Hawaii Supreme
Court established their Committee on Jury Innovations for
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16. For background materials on the Hawaii committee’s work, see
Final Report of Hawaii Committee on Jury Innovations for the
21st Century (Jan. 1999); and Supplemental Report of Hawaii
Committee on Jury Innovations for the 21st Century (Nov. 1999).
17. Supplemental Report, supra note 16, at 3.
18. See Hawaii Committee on Jury Innovations for the 21st Century,
Proposed Order (Jan. 1999), available at http://mano.icsd.hawaii.
gov/jud/juryor.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
19. Order Concerning Jury Innovations, HI Orders LEXIS 2000-6
(May 5, 2000).
20. Ohio Supreme Court Task Force on Jury Service, Report and
Recommendations (Feb. 2004), available at http://www. sconet.
state.oh.us/publications/juryTF/jurytf_proposal.pdf (last visited
Aug. 29, 2004).
21. Id., App. B.
22. See Court System Launches Second Phase of Jury Reform in New
York (news release, June 17, 2004), and COMMISSION ON THE JURY,
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE JURY TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (June 2004), both available at
http://www.jurycommission.com/pr2004_11.pdf (last visited
Aug. 29, 2004).
the 21st Century with the mission to “study and obtain infor-
mation about jury trial innovations considered or adopted by
other states.”16 At its first meeting, the group decided that a
pilot program, to involve five circuit court judges (the num-
ber was later increased to six), would be beneficial in testing
the effectiveness of innovations in the civil and criminal
courts.  The Hawaii Supreme Court authorized this pilot pro-
gram upon request of the committee and set the window of its
activity to be July 1, 1998 through October 15, 1999.  In the
course of this 15-month period, “judges participating in the
pilot project . . . conducted seventy-seven criminal trials and
ten civil trials.”  A key clause in the Hawaii Supreme Court
order gave the six judges involved discretionary power over
the innovations that they tested in the courtroom, thus leav-
ing the ultimate responsibility for the test in the hands of six
individuals.
These six judges ended up testing ten different innovations,
including allowing jurors to take notes, juror questions to wit-
nesses in civil and criminal trials, jury instructions prior to
closing arguments, and others.  Courts that took part in the
study responded to surveys regarding their experiences, result-
ing in 1,063 responses in criminal cases and 136 in civil cases.
The responses largely supported innovative procedures.  For
example, 88% of attorneys in civil trials and 90% of attorneys
in criminal trials stated that none of the innovations negatively
impacted the trial.  In addition, they found “statistically signif-
icant evidence supporting the proposed advantages of both
juror note-taking and question asking . . . both innovations
were found to be supported by jurors, whether they used the
opportunities afforded them or not.”17 In the end, all but one
of these innovations was recommended by the committee.18
The singular exception concerned pre-deliberation juror dis-
cussion of evidence in civil trials.  As a result of this report, the
Hawaii Supreme Court issued an order, effective July 1, 2000,
that altered the court rules related to jury innovations, making
virtually all of the changes recommended by the committee’s
report.19
It would be mere speculation to state the Hawaii changes
may have impacted the previously mentioned case of Lucinda
Whiting had it occurred in the Aloha State.  Rather, the ques-
tion becomes, what did Ohio do to correct the problems illus-
trated by the Columbus Dispatch?  In July 2002, Chief Justice
Thomas Moyer appointed a jury task force to study the jury
system in Ohio and to recommend relevant innovations.  The
group was independent from the Supreme Court. The task
force split itself into two subcommittees, with one focusing on
trial practice and the other on jury administration.  While the
jury administration subcommittee focused in on survey results
on jury administration and previous research, the trial practice
committee “used initial surveys to determine what practices
are currently in use in Ohio courts and subsequently engaged
volunteer judges to participate in pilot projects testing innov-
ative courtroom practices to enhance jurors’ understanding of
cases and their satisfaction with service.”20
The pilot projects began in April 2003 and were modeled on
the Massachusetts pilot.  The pilots were conducted until mid-
November 2003.  Judges from across the state volunteered to
take part in the project.  Up to 13 innovations were tested at the
discretion of participating judges.  Again, like Massachusetts,
judges, attorneys, and jurors completed surveys to measure the
usefulness of the innovations, resulting in “a total of 1,855
questionnaires . . . completed and analyzed, including 146 judi-
cial questionnaires, 289 attorney questionnaires and 1,420
juror questionnaires.”  The analysis, performed by Dr. James
Frank of the University of Cincinnati, showed that each inno-
vation tested “was well received by jurors, judges and, to a
slightly lesser extent, attorneys.”  The conclusion of the report
summarized the findings, stating “judges, attorneys and jurors
were generally supportive of the courtroom activities . . . .
[T]his support manifested itself in survey responses . . . .
[O]verall, the innovations examined appear to be helpful to the
proceedings and the majority of courtroom participants have
responded positively to the processes in general.”21 The report
was released in February 2004.  
While the foregoing pilot programs have given some vital
information as to the successes of innovative efforts, it is
once again important to note that these programs are not the
only innovation efforts that have occurred in the United
States.  New York, for example, has done extensive work on
jury reform, though not relying exclusively on pilot pro-
grams.  A standing Commission on the Jury has held public
hearings throughout the state in order to obtain wide citizen
input on the present and prospective conditions of the jury
trial in the Empire State.  Through the efforts of that stand-
ing commission, there were new recommendations issued
and changes enacted with respect to jury trials as recently as
June 17, 2004.22 New York also keeps detailed information
on their jury selection processes which provides an invalu-
able data base regarding the efficiency of the court regarding
juries.  
In contrast, the initiative for jury innovations in
Washington, D.C. began in the private sector. There, a non-
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profit corporation, the Council for Court Excellence gained
foundation grants to fund the D.C. Jury Project, a top-to-bot-
tom study of the jury trial systems in the District of Columbia.
The final recommendations for improvements took the form of
a 1997 report, “Juries for the Year 2000 and Beyond.” The D.C.
Jury Project was unique in that it was totally funded by private-
sector contributions and its recommendations were received—
and acted upon—by both the federal and state-type trial courts
in our nation’s capitol.
It is evident the 30 states that have done some type of work
on jury innovation have each gone about it in ways uniquely
their own.  Many states have performed studies. Many others
have carefully organized steps to implement jury trial innova-
tions.  And as depicted above, many have utilized pilot pro-
grams.  However, the data on what actually is being done is
often difficult to come by.  In those states that have not per-
formed exhaustive studies or formulated reports, it can be a
daunting task to fathom the landscape.  This lack of knowledge
begs for answers to several questions.  What is the state of the
jury trial system in every state?  How can trial judges and
lawyers communicate with each other about jury trial issues
and improvements?  How can court leaders in states that have
not undertaken a study of their jury trial systems come to learn
valuable lessons from their colleagues in the other state courts?
THE FUTURE: A NATIONAL JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS
PROGRAM
In this context, it is fitting that a National Program to
Increase Citizen Participation in Jury Service Through Jury
Innovations (“the Program”) has been launched.  The
Program builds on momentum from the first-ever National
Jury Summit in 2001, led by the National Center for State
Courts and Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Unified
Court System.  
The purpose of the Jury Summit was to bring together rep-
resentatives from across the nation to examine the state of
America’s jury system, share innovative practices, and plan for
continued improvement.  Over 400 persons from 45 states
attended, including state and federal judges from the trial and
appellate benches, court administrators, clerks, attorneys, rep-
resentatives from community-based organizations, and even
jurors.  The legacy of the Jury Summit was to encourage states
to expand efforts to improve the jury system nationwide.  The
results have been encouraging.  
Following the basic themes of the National Jury Summit,
the Program centers on citizen outreach and improving the
conditions of jury service. Citizen outreach about the glory of
the jury system and civic responsibility are hollow, however, if
citizens who report are treated poorly—in terms of the facili-
ties, or lack of respect for their time (and that of their employ-
ers), or compelled hardship to themselves or their families.  To
these people, Thomas Jefferson’s statement that “serving on a
jury is more important than voting” is entirely lost.
Consequently the Program is designed to provide courts with
methods to improve citizen attitudes toward jury service.  It
will provide a service package that explains how several juris-
dictions have developed outreach programs to promote com-
munity appreciation of trial by jury. The Program will also
make technical assistance available to help jurisdictions that
are interested in making the jury trial itself a more informa-
tion-centered endeavor.  
The National Center for State Courts leads these efforts
through its Center for Jury Studies.  It is joined by two other
court assistance organizations, the Council for Court
Excellence (Washington, D.C.) and the Maricopa County Trial
Court Leadership Center (Phoenix, Ariz.).
Employing well-established business management prac-
tices, the Center is undertaking a sequence of tasks.  First, it is
systematically gathering a compendium of current state jury
management practices known as the “State of the States.”
Upon completion, it will establish the first-ever, baseline mea-
sure of the statutes, rules, customs, and practices that define
jury systems across the country.  The State of the States docu-
mentation will span an operational spectrum ranging from ini-
tial summoning to final dismissal after verdict.
Contemporaneously, prescriptive packages are being devel-
oped to describe practices that have proven to be highly effec-
tive in states that have already undertaken jury trial renova-
tions.  The “best practices” packages will cover four priority
areas: (1) improving citizen response to jury summonses, (2)
comprehensibility of jury instructions, (3) model legislation
and rules to anchor jury reforms,23 and (4) jury management
workshops for urban courts.  The prescriptive packages will be
used as technical assistance tools and made widely available
A national project to increase use of effective jury reform
methods and to improve the conditions of jury service has
begun.  It is a joint project of the National Center for State
Courts’ Center for Jury Studies, the Council for Court
Excellence (Washington, D.C.), and the Trial Court
Leadership Center of Maricopa County (Phoenix, Ariz.).
The project—officially the “National Program to Increase
Citizen Participation in Jury Service Through Jury
Innovations”—seeks to increase citizen awareness of posi-
tive aspects of jury service and to improve conditions of jury
service.  The project will deliver tools and technical assis-
tance needed by judges, attorneys, and court administrators
to meet these objectives.
Major projects planned are (1) providing technical assis-
tance to state and local courts to implement innovative jury
practices, (2) compiling a “State of the States” database of
jury practices throughout the United States, and (3) provid-
ing a series of “prescriptive packages” to improve response
to jury summonses, comprehension of jury instructions,
and effective jury management in urban courts.
A descriptive brochure summarizing the plans of the
National Program to Increase Citizen Participation in Jury
Service Through Jury Innovations can be found at http://
www.ncsconline.org/Juries/04-050046%20Jury%20Trends-
Flyer.pdf.  For more information about the program, contact
Tom Munsterman, Director of the National Center’s Center
for Jury Studies, by phone (703-841-5620) or by e-mail
(tmunsterman@ncsc.dni.us).  
NATIONAL JURY REFORM PROJECT LAUNCHED
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through the National Center, the National Judicial College,
and state judicial education programs.
To begin implementation, a “to-be-determined” number of
courts will be selected.  The chief justice and state court
administrator will be approached and involved to the fullest
extent in each case.  When the court selections are made, pro-
gram staff will work directly with the courts to establish an
individualized plan of action from a full menu of jury innova-
tions.  Depending on what stage a selected jurisdiction is at in
the process of jury system renovation, the technical assistance
will follow one of several established paths described below.
For a jurisdiction just getting started, the Program would
suggest that the state supreme court appoint a broad based
committee to examine many aspects of the state jury system.
This committee or task force would report back to the court
with recommendations.  The National Center staff would
guide and assist all along the way.
If a state has already begun a renewal effort that has stalled,
the Program staff will help the state re-ignite its innovation
actions.   In states where reform implementation is discre-
tionary with individual trial judges, the Program will offer a
replication of the successful approach undertaken in
Massachusetts.  
Clearly, the National Program will create crucial benefits for
state courts.  Measurable results include: the increased use of
innovative practices by judges, reduced burden upon jurors
and employers, reduced citizen non-response to summonses, a
greater proportion of our population actually serving on juries,
less juror waiting time in court, fewer questions asked by
deliberating juries, and a more well-trained judiciary.  There
will also be more instances of juries being representative of the
community in terms of age, education, occupation, and pro-
fession.  Across our land we should see more efficient and cost-
effective jury systems.  Trial jurors will be better informed.  In
other words, juror decision-making and satisfaction will be
enhanced.  Importantly, there should be greater public trust
and confidence in jury verdicts and the courts.  
Gregory A. Mize currently serves as a consultant
to the National Center for State Courts’ Center
for Jury Studies.  Before that, he served as a
judge on the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia from 1990 to 2002.  While there, Mize
presided over hundreds of jury trials, both civil
and criminal, and also conducted more than 800
settlement conferences.  In 1997 and 1998, he
co-chaired the D.C. Jury Project, which issued its nationally recog-
nized recommendations in 1998.  From 1983 to 1990, he served as
general counsel to the District of Columbia City Council.  He
received his A.B. in philosophy from Loyola University in Chicago
and his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center; he has
served as an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law
Center and the University of Virginia School of Law.  
Christopher J. Connelly is a court research ana-
lyst for the National Center for State Courts
Center for Jury Studies in Arlington, Virginia.
Before joining the Center for Jury Studies,
Connelly worked as an intern in the National
Center’s Knowledge and Information Services
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23. The American Legislative Exchange Council has developed model
jury legislation to facilitate jury service.  The model law is referred
to as “The Jury Patriotism Act.”  See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens, & Carey Silverman, The Jury Patriotism Act: Making Jury
Service More Appealing and Rewarding to Citizens, STATE FACTOR
(April 2003), available at http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/
pdf/0309.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2004). 
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This article will describe the methods used to study juries and
jury trials and present recent data now available for each of the
major proposed innovations. We also draw on new findings
from our own recent research testing the comparative advan-
tages of jury innovations for understanding complex scientific
evidence.
METHODS USED TO STUDY JURY INNOVATIONS
Researchers have taken a variety of approaches in studying
the effects of jury innovations. Some involve using the scien-
tific method of experimentation.6
Mock Jury Experiments:  Many jury researchers, partic-
ularly psychologists, use mock jury experiments to test
the impact of an innovation. The experimental
approach has been used in many scientific studies.
Participants are asked to assume the role of jurors,
hear trial evidence, and reach a verdict in a mock trial.
To examine the effects of a specific trial reform such as
jury note taking, some participants are randomly
assigned to take notes and others are not. The perfor-
mance and decisions of the people taking notes are
compared to the participants in the control group to
assess the impact of note taking. Most mock jury
experiments take place in university research laborato-
ries.
Field Experiments:  Field experiments take advantage
of the scientific power of random assignment. But
instead of using people from the community or even
college students and asking them to assume a hypo-
thetical role, the field experiment takes place in the
During the past decade, state jury reform commissions,many individual federal and state judges, and jury schol-ars have advocated the adoption of a variety of innova-
tive trial procedures to assist jurors in trials.  These include
reforms as prosaic as allowing juror note taking and furnishing
jurors with copies of written instructions, through more con-
troversial changes, such as allowing jurors to ask questions of
witnesses or permitting them to discuss the case together dur-
ing breaks in the trial.  Accounts of the nature and purpose of
the innovations and the pace of change are found in this issue
of Court Review1 and elsewhere.2 These innovations are now
catalogued in convenient form, accompanied by practical guid-
ance for judges.3
Many jury trial reforms reflect growing awareness of best
practices in education and communication as well as research
documenting that jurors take an active rather than a passive
approach to their decision-making task.4 Traditional adversary
jury trial procedures often appear to assume that jurors are
blank slates, who will passively wait until the end of the trial
and the start of jury deliberations to form opinions about the
evidence. However, we now know that jurors quite actively
engage in evidence evaluation, developing their opinions as the
trial progresses. It makes sense to revise trial procedures so they
take advantage of jurors’ decision-making tendencies and
strengths.5
Although reform groups have endorsed many of these inno-
vations, until recently there was only modest evidence about
their impact in the courtroom.  Now, substantial research on the
effects of most of the reforms on juror comprehension and juror
satisfaction with the trial has been completed and reported.
Data are now available to judges and others seeking reliable
empirical support for the changes to the traditional jury trial.
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real world. To test a jury innovation, actual jury trials
are randomly assigned to be conducted with a particu-
lar innovation or not. Just as with mock jury experi-
ments, jurors in the experimental and control condi-
tions are compared to determine the impact of the jury
innovation. 
Non-Experimental Studies. Many states have tested the
effects of jury reforms in systematic ways, although
these studies do not include random assignment and
experimentation. Our article describes state pilot pro-
grams and other efforts to assess trial participants’
views and reactions to new jury trial procedures. One
common approach is to survey or interview trial partici-
pants, including jurors, following a trial, collecting
their perceptions about jury innovations used during
the trial. So, for example, in a trial in which a judge
permitted jurors to ask questions, the judge, the
lawyers, and the jurors might all be surveyed about
what they thought about the reform and how it
affected the jury’s work. 
Each of these methods has characteristic strengths and lim-
itations. Interviews and surveys rely on trial participants being
able to report accurately how an innovation affected them.
Mock jury experiments can present a more controlled environ-
ment, but participants are not really deciding someone’s fate.
Field experiments appear to be an ideal marriage of scientific
power and the reality of jury decision making, but they are rare.
Some judges are reluctant to use random assignment with
actual jury trials. Pilot programs could reflect the unique situ-
ation of particular jurisdictions. Thus, it is necessary to employ
all of these divergent approaches to studying the effects of jury
reforms, looking for a convergence of findings. Below we
describe how research using these methods has discovered
valuable information about the operation and impact of jury
trial innovations.
RECENT EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS OF JURY TRIAL
INNOVATIONS
Eight innovations have attracted the most attention of jury
researchers and state reform groups: juror note taking, ques-
tions from jurors intended for witnesses, discussions of the evi-
dence by jurors during civil trials, pre-instructing jurors on the
applicable law, providing jurors with juror notebooks, instruct-
ing the jury before closing arguments, providing each juror
with a copy of the instructions, and offering suggestions
regarding jury deliberations.
NOTE TAKING
In some states, judges are required to inform jurors that they
may take notes if they desire and to furnish jurors with the nec-
7. Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-Aid
Innovations on Juror Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86
JUDICATURE 184 (2003).
8. Id., at 188-89.
9. David L. Rosenhan, Sara L. Eisner, & Robert J. Robinson,
Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1994).
10. B. Michael Dann, Valerie P. Hans, & David H. Kaye, Testing the
Effects of Selected Jury Trial Innovations on Juror
Comprehension of Contested mtDNA Evidence (Final Technical
Report to National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C. 2004).
essary materials.  Trial judges
in most other state and federal
courtrooms may permit juror
note taking, or not, at the
judge’s discretion.  More are
doing so, but many still do not.
Research on juror note tak-
ing has been undertaken both
with mock juries in controlled
settings and actual juries in
field experiments. Both lines of
research find no evidence of
any risk to juror note taking. The field studies show wide-
spread support among trial participants for permitting jurors
to take notes. Jurors themselves routinely report that note tak-
ing is helpful.  Some studies show significant improvement in
juror comprehension and memory.
Researchers Lynne ForsterLee and Irwin Horowitz con-
ducted a series of mock trials of complex tort cases using jury-
eligible adults.7 They report that experience with note taking
improved jurors’ performances at several levels, including
memory and understanding of the evidence and overall satis-
faction with the trial process.
We found that note-taking juries were able to better
organize and construct the evidence and, importantly,
this in turn led to improved and more efficient
(focused on the evidence) deliberations. . . . Note-tak-
ing juries believed they were more efficient, and they
expressed greater satisfaction with the trial process as
compared to their non note-taking jury counterparts.
Lastly, note-taking juries were more likely to recognize
case-related facts and reject “lures” (statements that
were not actually in the trial) than were non note-tak-
ing juries.8
In another mock jury experiment involving 128 college stu-
dents, Rosenhan and his colleagues also found statistically sig-
nificant evidence that note taking increased recall of trial infor-
mation and enriched note takers’ subjective experiences.9
Note takers had better recall of the trial evidence than non-
note takers.  Compared to non-note takers, note takers rated
themselves as more attentive, more involved in the trial, and
more able to keep up with the proceedings.
Most recently, in a research project funded by the National
Institute of Justice, the authors of this article conducted a
series of 60 mock jury trials to test the effects of four jury trial
reforms on juror understanding of contested DNA presenta-
tions.10 Of the 400 jurors instructed they could take notes dur-
ing trials of an armed robbery case, fully 89% responded that
notes helped them remember or understand the evidence.  As
expected, there was an “education effect”; those jurors with
[N]ote takers
rated themselves
as more attentive,
more involved in
the trial, and 
more able to 
keep up with
the proceedings. 
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more formal education
were more likely to take
notes. Juror satisfaction
with verdicts was higher
among note takers.  Mock
jurors were very supportive
of allowing juror note tak-
ing during actual trials;
89% indicated they favored
jury note taking. Jurors’
responses to objective
knowledge questions about
the DNA evidence did not establish that note taking alone pro-
duced significantly better comprehension compared to a con-
trol group, though. There was some evidence that when note
taking is combined with another innovation, such as jury note-
books or DNA checklists, performance was enhanced.
Juror note taking has also been studied in field settings. A
yearlong pilot program in Massachusetts tested a number of
innovations in civil and criminal trials. 11 Data were collected
from 1,590 participants. Almost all of the jurors (96%)
responded that note taking was somewhat to very helpful.
There was a general consensus among participating judges that
jurors in all Massachusetts trials ought to be able to take notes.  
Ohio’s Jury Service Task Force conducted a pilot study
involving 31 counties, 49 judges, and 1,420 jurors from civil
and criminal trials.12 Ninety-eight percent of the pilot program
judges who were surveyed about their experiences supported
note taking.  The 289 attorneys polled agreed, adding there
were no significant negatives. A solid majority of the jurors
found note taking helpful.
A similar pilot project in Tennessee undertaken as part of
that state’s jury reform effort surveyed judges and jurors from
45 trials.13 All of the participating judges supported note tak-
ing by jurors.  Eighty percent of jurors said their notes were
helpful during jury deliberations.
One of the most ambitious projects was a set of two field
experiments in which jury trials were randomly assigned to
different jury innovations or a control group.14 Jury note tak-
ing and juror questions were the innovations studied. The
investigators, jury researchers Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod,
compared juries that were allowed or not allowed to take
notes, but found no strong effects either for or against note
taking. Two-thirds of the jurors took notes, and they were
somewhat more satisfied with the trial than other jurors, but
there was no clear evidence that their memory for trial facts
was superior because they had taken notes. On the other hand,
the experiment did not bear out the disadvantages of note tak-
ing advanced by opponents of the innovation.  Note taking was
not a distraction. The notes were generally accurate, did not
favor one side over the other, did not give note takers an unfair
advantage over non-note takers during deliberations, and did
not extend deliberations.  
In sum, the recent research on juror note taking demon-
strates that jurors believe the innovation enhances memory
and understanding of the evidence, that judges and jurors
strongly support the procedure, and that scant evidence exists
of significant downsides to the innovation.  There is some
modest objective evidence that jury note taking significantly
improves recall or comprehension.
ALLOWING JURORS TO ASK QUESTIONS AT TRIAL
The practice of permitting juror questions of witnesses
(submitted to the judge in writing for screening) is growing
and is increasingly authorized by court rule or case law.  A
2004 decision of the Supreme Court of Vermont observed that
the vast majority of states and all ten federal circuits that have
considered the issue permit juror questions of witnesses in
criminal cases at the discretion of the trial judge.15 Still, jurors
are not permitted to submit their questions in a high percent-
age of today’s courtrooms.
Like note taking, permitting jurors to put questions to the
witnesses has received substantial attention from researchers.
In their 1997 article reporting on their field study of actual
trials in which note taking and juror questions were tested,
Heuer and Penrod concluded that juror questions enhanced
juror satisfaction with the trial process and jurors’ confidence
that they had enough information to decide the case, and that
the process created some useful feedback for the attorneys.16
Nevertheless, there was insufficient evidence to support the
claims that the process will uncover important evidence or
lead to greater overall juror satisfaction with the trial.
Conversely, the data did not bear out the concerns that per-
mitting juror questions would be unduly disruptive, would
prolong the trial, would unfairly surprise the lawyers, would
burden the judge or staff, or that jurors’ questions would be
inappropriate. 
In an extensive study involving juror questions in 239 crim-
inal trials in Colorado, researchers administered question-
naires to the judges, attorneys, and jurors who participated.
They concluded: “Overall, the results reveal that juror ques-
tioning has little negative impact on trial proceedings and may,
in fact, improve courtroom dynamics.”17 Regarding the oft-
heard complaint that juror questions will help the prosecution
meet its burden of proof, only 16% of judges and 23% of attor-
neys felt that jurors’ questions assisted in meeting the burden
11. Paula L. Hannaford & G. Thomas Munsterman, Final Report for
the Massachusetts Project on Innovative Jury Trial Practices
(National Center for Citizen Participation in the Administration
of Justice 2001).
12. James Frank & Tamara Madensen, Survey to Assess and Improve
Jury Service in Ohio, Appendix B to Report and
Recommendations of the Supreme Court of Ohio Task Force on
Jury Service (2004).
13. Neil P. Cohen & Daniel R. Cohen, Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34
MEMPHIS L. REV. 1 (2003).
14. Steven Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense:  Assessing
Aids to Jury Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 259
(1997).
15. State v. Doleszny, 844 A.2d 773 (Vt. 2004).
16. Penrod & Heuer, supra note 14.
17. Mary Dodge, Should Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Cases?  A
Report to the Colorado Supreme Court’s Jury System Committee
(2002).
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of proof.  Almost three-fourths of both groups answered “No”
or “No Opinion” to the question.  Almost 80% of judges
favored jury questioning in criminal cases.  Prosecutors and
defense counsel were divided:  90% of prosecutors favored
allowing jury questions; only 30% of defenders did so. Note,
however, that opposition to the procedure decreased by 50%
among defense counsel after their experience in the pilot pro-
gram.  
A 1999 pilot project in Los Angeles County Superior Court
in which judges experimented with a number of jury innova-
tions reported that 92% of the jurors told they could ask ques-
tions had very positive opinions about the procedure.18 The
overwhelming majority of jurors felt that being allowed to put
their questions to witnesses improved their role as decision
makers and made them feel more involved in the trial.  Ninety-
three percent of the judges said the process did not unduly pro-
long trials.
Following the Massachusetts pilot of juror questions, 96%
of the judges who received juror questions thought the proce-
dure was helpful and worthwhile.
Over 88% of the Ohio judges who participated in its pilot
program testing the procedure approved of allowing jurors to
ask questions.19 None of the purported risks of allowing jurors
to put questions materialized.  Over three-fourths of surveyed
jurors reported that question asking helped them remain atten-
tive, and 63% said that the answers to their questions aided
their decision making.
After a six-month pilot program of allowing juror questions
in New Jersey civil trials, the committee recommended that the
New Jersey Supreme Court approve the procedure by rule,
concluding:
No study of actual trials can measure the results
against the theory in any scientifically reliable way.
However, the questionnaires completed by the jurors,
judges, and attorneys gave us significant informa-
tion—including the fact that out of 127 trials con-
ducted by 11 judges in as many counties, no one sug-
gested that the process had an unfair effect on the out-
come of the trial. . . . It is our perception that there
need be no tension between the goal of a trial as a
search for justice, and the method of the adversarial
process.20
The participating New Jersey judges, who received a median
number of nine questions per trial (77% of which were put to
a witness), unanimously favored the procedure, as did the
overwhelming number of jurors.  Trials were lengthened by 30
minutes, but jurors reported that answers to their questions
shortened the time required for deliberations.  Almost 60% of
the pilot project attorneys also
supported adoption of the
eventual rule.  
The Tennessee pilot pro-
gram of allowing juror ques-
tions in trials reported similar
juror support for the proce-
dure—89%.21
In our mock jury experi-
ment, 160 of the 480 mock jurors were instructed they could
submit written questions to the expert DNA witnesses.22 A
total of 49 relevant questions (average of 2.45 per trial) were
received and answered.  Most questions sought further expla-
nations or elaborations of technical DNA evidence presented
by the expert witnesses.  Jurors who had taken more science
and mathematics courses were more likely to ask questions.
There was only a weak correlation between education and sci-
ence or math job experience and the likelihood of asking ques-
tions.  Support for the innovation among those in the ques-
tion-asking conditions was very high—97%. When asked how
the question procedure helped, almost 75% of jurors answered
that the procedure helped them better understand the evi-
dence.   No objective differences in comprehension were
found, however.  
At least one other researcher has completed a study of a
large number of juror questions to discover what jurors are
asking.23 Nicole Mott conducted a content analysis of 2,271
juror questions from 164 actual trials, both criminal and civil.
A median number of seven questions were asked per trial.  She
concluded that jurors used their questions to clarify previous
testimony of both lay and expert witnesses and to inquire
about common practices of unfamiliar professions.  Mott
found that jurors exercised the privilege of asking questions in
responsible ways to enhance the quality of decision making.
She concluded that the process was not detrimental to the
adversarial trial.  These latter conclusions coincide with the
earlier findings from a national study by the American
Judicature Society.24
Finally, this issue of Court Review features an article analyz-
ing jurors’ attitudes and reactions when their questions go
unanswered.25
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
APPLICABLE LAW
In most jurisdictions, the trial judge has the discretion to
include in the court’s preliminary jury instructions at least some
of the law that will govern the case.  Some states now require it
by court rule; many individual judges in other jurisdictions are
doing so on their own.  The available research focuses on the
advantages to jurors who hear and read a legal “road map” they
18. Jacqueline A. Connor, Los Angeles Trial Courts Test Jury
Innovations, 67 DEF. COUNSEL J. 186 (2000).
19. Frank & Madensen, supra note 12.
20. Report on Pilot Project Allowing Juror Questions 2 (New Jersey
Supreme Court’s Civil Practice Committee 2001)
21. Cohen & Cohen supra note 13.
22. Dann et al., supra, note 10.
23. Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or
Not to Ask, That Is the Question,” 78 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1099
(2003).
24. TOWARD MORE ACTIVE JURIES: TAKING NOTES AND ASKING QUESTIONS
(American Judicature Society 1991).
25. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, and Beth Murphy, Jurors’
Unanswered Questions, Spring 2004 COURT REVIEW at 20.
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will be expected to follow at
the outset of the case instead
of having to wait until the
conclusion of trial, when
legal instructions are tradi-
tionally given.
In their work involving
mock jury trials of complex
tort cases, ForsterLee and
Horowitz demonstrated that
pre-instructed jurors scored
significantly better on recall
and comprehension measures.26 They concluded: “[S]ubstan-
tive pre-instruction provided jurors with a framework, or
schema, that enabled them to organize the trial facts according
to legal guidelines as they were being presented.  The advan-
tage of substantive pre-instruction was apparent.”  The authors
added, “[J]urors made better decisions when they had a coher-
ent framework to organize the initial processing and subse-
quent recall of the trial evidence.”   Combining note taking and
pre-instruction on at least some of the law the jury will be
expected to enhance juror cognition still further. 
In the Tennessee pilot project testing various reform pro-
posals, some of the juries in the 45 trials received substantive
preliminary instructions.27 Almost all the juror participants
(98%) found the early instructions helpful; 81% reported they
were “very helpful.”  Attorneys in the same cases were “virtu-
ally unanimous” that they considered the preliminary instruc-
tions on the law helpful.
The pilot study in Los Angeles County Superior Court also
tested substantive preliminary instructions.28 Ninety-eight
percent of the 200 reporting jurors gave a “very positive” rat-
ing to the procedure, adding that the law provided in advance
of evidence enabled them to focus better during the trial and
enhanced their comprehension of the evidence.
In Ohio, where preliminary instructions on the law were
given to some of the juries in that state’s study, 75% of the
judges agreed that they helped jurors follow the evidence; only
7% disagreed.29
Finally, in the Massachusetts jury project, 94% of the jurors
who participated in the trials where substantive preliminary
instructions were given said they were somewhat to very help-
ful.30 The vast majority of attorneys agreed that the prelimi-
nary instructions provided jurors with a better understanding
of the legal issues and facilitated better juror focus during trial.
Three-fourths of the trial judges reported that substantive pre-
liminary instructions helped jurors to follow the evidence. 
JUROR NOTEBOOKS IN LENGTHY AND COMPLEX
TRIALS 
Given recent anecdotal reports from judges and attorneys
and a recent spate of journal articles on the technique, provid-
ing jurors with individual multipurpose notebooks for their
use during the trial and their deliberations appears to be
becoming more popular, especially in complex cases and
lengthy trials.31
Research regarding the value of juror notebooks was
extremely limited until recently.  As their use has increased, so
has the empirical data. 
In her research on jury trial complexity, Nicole Mott asked
jurors who had used notebooks about their experiences.32 In
addition to noting the utility of having copies of the important
documents in evidence and a seating chart of trial principals,
jurors expressed concerns that the tendency to place too much
information in the notebooks can make them impractical to
use if not overwhelming.
In the authors’ research testing the effects of four jury trial
innovations on juror recall and understanding of contested
DNA evidence, multipurpose notebooks were provided to
jurors in 20 of the 60 mock trials.33 The notebooks contained
a glossary of DNA terms, a checklist tailored to the DNA evi-
dence, a list of witnesses in the case, copies of the experts’
slides and blank paper for note taking. Ninety-two percent of
the jurors supplied notebooks reported that they used them to
review the contents; 90% found them somewhat or extremely
helpful.  When asked how the notebooks helped, 79% of jurors
reported that the notebooks’ contents enhanced their under-
standing and recall of the evidence.  Fully 93% of the jurors
favored the use of notebooks in trials.  Jurors who were pro-
vided with notebooks scored significantly higher on the Juror
Comprehension Scale than those not supplied with notebooks.
Further, those supplied with the notebook and instructed they
could take notes during trial outperformed those only permit-
ted to take notes.  
The states that have investigated the effects of supplying
jurors with notebooks have reported similar results. 
California:  Responses of 200 jurors in the Los Angeles County
pilot study made clear that notebooks containing copies of key
exhibits, among other things, made it easier to locate needed
information during deliberations.34
Ohio:  Among the surveyed judges and jurors that participated
in the pilot study trials where notebooks were furnished jurors,
72% of jurors found notebooks helpful and 50% “very help-
16 Court Review - Spring 2004
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40. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jurors Discussions
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Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003).  
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ful.”35 Sixty-seven percent of the judges thought the note-
books helped the parties’ presentations; 72% said the note-
books assisted jurors in understanding exhibits.
Tennessee:  When 418 jurors were asked about multipurpose
notebooks, 90% responded that they were useful in performing
their tasks.  All attorneys in the same cases, with just one
exception, gave the notebook experience a positive rating.36
Massachusetts:  All of the judges who oversaw preparation of
notebooks and furnished notebooks to jurors reported that
they were helpful and worthwhile.37
Thus, recent research and judicial experience with jury note-
books, particularly in complicated cases, provide support for
their use.
STRUCTURED JUROR DISCUSSIONS OF EVIDENCE
DURING CIVIL TRIALS
The innovation considered the most radical and controver-
sial is the one that turns on its head the traditional rule swear-
ing civil jurors to silence during the entire trial, no matter how
long, complex, or stressful.  Jurors are instructed prior to civil
trials that they may discuss the evidence during the trial, but
only among other jurors; only in the privacy of the jury room;
only when all jurors are present to participate; and only on
condition that they reserve judgments about the ultimate
issues until they have heard all of the evidence, the court’s final
instructions on the law, and the arguments of counsel.  The
reform, adopted by rule in Arizona and subjected to evaluation
by independent jury experts, is being watched closely by other
jurisdictions and judges who favor reform generally.  The
research reveals strong support by judges and jurors.  Only
modest evidence was found supporting the assertions of pro-
ponents that discussions will enhance juror memory and com-
prehension.  Little evidence was cited that validates the critics’
fears that such discussions would lead to premature judgments
regarding the outcomes of cases.
The first study of this innovation was by a team of
researchers that included one of this article’s authors, Valerie
Hans.  Together with Paula Hannaford and G. Thomas
Munsterman of the National Center for State Courts, Hans
conducted a field experiment in Arizona to study the effects of
civil jurors’ trial discussions. In approximately 160 Arizona
civil jury trials in four counties, the researchers used random
assignment of the cases to “Discuss” and “No Discuss” condi-
tions. Trial participants were quite supportive of the reform.38
Support for the change ran very high among judges and jurors
particularly: three-fourths
or more of each group
responded positively to the
new procedure.  Attorneys
favored the new practice,
but at the lower rate of 51%.
Attorney support increased
as they gained more experi-
ence with jurors being able
to discuss the evidence dur-
ing their trials.
Hannaford, Hans, and
Munsterman analyzed the
data collected regarding the
effects of the change permit-
ting juror discussions in civil cases.39 Jurors who discussed the
evidence during the trial reported that the discussions were
very helpful in resolving confusion about the evidence.
However, the jurors’ self-reports about how well they under-
stood the evidence overall, and the degree that judges agreed
with the jury verdicts, were not affected by the opportunity to
discuss the evidence. 
The researchers also found that jurors in the two conditions
did not differ in the timing of opinion formation about out-
come issues.  The data belied a principal fear voiced by skep-
tics of the new rule, that permitting such discussions among
jurors would lead to premature judgments on the merits of the
case.  No such pattern was detected. 
The most recent field study of structured discussions of evi-
dence by Arizona jurors, conducted by Shari Seidman
Diamond and Neil Vidmar, closely examined 50 civil trials
after videotaping the trials, all juror discussions during breaks
in the trial, and all juror deliberations.40 The investigators
described what jurors discuss when instructed in accordance
with the new rule:
During discussions jurors sought information about the
testimony from one another to assist them in recalling
testimony, obtain needed clarification, or provide mean-
ing to facts.  They also discussed questions that they
had submitted to the court or that they planned to sub-
mit, and they talked about evidence that had not yet
been presented that they would like to have.  Case stud-
ies in the complex cases examining the correspondence
between the trial evidence and the answers that jurors
gave when their fellow jurors sought information dur-
ing discussions revealed that discussion did result in
more accurate understandings of trial evidence.41
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The authors found only
modest evidence that the inno-
vation positively affected juror
comprehension or recall of the
trial evidence or law.  With
some recommendations for pro-
cedural changes in the Arizona
practice, they concluded that
structured juror discussions
before formal deliberations can
assist juries hearing complex
cases.  Like the researchers who
had gone to Arizona before to
study the same practice,
Diamond and Vidmar did not
find evidence that jurors
allowed to discuss the evidence during trial pre-decide the mer-
its of the cases they heard at any earlier stage than their coun-
terparts repeatedly sworn to silence:  “No jury arrived at a
group decision on the verdict in the course of discussions.”
Some other state reform groups have taken a “wait-and-see”
attitude toward this uniquely Arizona reform; others have
rejected it outright.  Some states have experimented with the
procedure and collected and assessed the resulting data.  
For example, the Massachusetts pilot program involving
various trial innovations tested the juror discussion procedure
as well.42 All of the judges that experimented with the inno-
vation thought it was helpful.  Of the jurors, 93% found the
opportunity to discuss the evidence during the trials helpful.
Only 2% of jurors said the opportunity the court offered them
was not helpful. 
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER CLOSING
ARGUMENTS
The advantages of giving the substantive final instructions
on the law before closing arguments by counsel, rather than
after, with the important procedural and “housekeeping” mat-
ters reserved until after counsel conclude, have been discussed
more at length elsewhere.43 Among other things, hearing the
applicable law from the judge before counsel argue gives the
jurors a reliable legal context to follow when they hear the
attorneys sum up on the facts and the law.  In addition, this pro-
cedure relieves counsel from having to “preview” the law for
the jurors, sometimes a risky task that provokes objections and
argument.  Besides, jurors ought to hear an organized and
coherent statement of the applicable legal rules from an author-
itative and neutral source—the judge, not the adversaries.
Data generated by recent research demonstrate
support for this modest change:
After a test of the procedure in several Tennessee tri-
als, the participating judges unanimously endorsed
instructing on the law prior to closing arguments.44
Almost all of the attorneys (93%) approved, and 85%
of jurors said it was helpful in understanding the argu-
ments of counsel.
In a similar project in Ohio,45 most judges (80%) and
attorneys (68%) agreed that instructing on the law
before closing arguments was more helpful to juries
than the traditional order.
In any event, the recommended practice calls for the
judge addressing the jury after counsel finish, since
there are important procedural matters remaining.46
SUGGESTIONS FROM THE JUDGE REGARDING
DELIBERATIONS
This commonsense idea springs from the simple facts that
so few members of a given jury have likely served before
through to verdict and most are strangers to the deliberation
process.  Studies on the matter demonstrate that jurors wel-
come and benefit from some helpful suggestions (as opposed
to directions) from the judge regarding the important tasks of
choosing a presiding juror and conducting of deliberations,
voting, etc.47
Again, the most recent research has been done at the behest
of state jury reform committees: 
In Massachusetts, 88% of jurors who received such
instructions from their trial judges found them help-
ful.48
Jurors in Ohio who received suggestions from the
court regarding their choosing a foreperson, conduct-
ing deliberations, conducting votes, and resolving dis-
agreements were similarly enthusiastic about receiv-
ing help.  They agreed, at rates of 81% to 92%, that the
suggestions were helpful.49
Readily adaptable resources are available for judges wishing
to offer such help to juries about to embark on deliberations.50
WRITTEN COPIES OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL
JURORS
Finally, furnishing each juror with a copy of court’s instruc-
tions before the instructions, so jurors can follow along as they
are read by the judge and have access to them during closing
arguments and deliberations, is another simple, thoughtful
18 Court Review - Spring 2004
Diamond and
Vidmar did not
find evidence that
jurors allowed 
to discuss the 
evidence during
trial pre-decide 
the merits . . . 
at any earlier
stage than their 
counterparts . . . .
                                      
51. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 3, at 174;
Dann, supra note 4, at 1259; ABA REPORT: JURY COMPREHENSION IN
COMPLEX CASES (Lit. Sec. 1989) (jurors unanimously found copies
helpful during deliberations).
52. Hannaford & Munsterman, supra note 11.
53. Connor, supra note 18.
54. Cohen & Cohen, supra note 13.
55. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
innovation.  The proponents of furnishing copies to each juror
contend that individual copies accommodate jurors’ different
learning styles, enhance comprehension, and reduce the num-
ber of questions about the instructions from deliberating
jurors.51
According to recent polling of judges, attorneys, and jurors,
support for individual written copies of instructions runs high.
Massachusetts:  98% of judges using the innovation
found it helpful.  Jurors who did not have individual
copies of the instructions asked 78% more questions
concerning the legal charge than jurors who were given
individual copies.52
California:  jurors in the pilot program furnished with
individual copies of the instructions sent out no ques-
tions about them during deliberations and 94% favored
the practice (80% were “strongly positive”).53
Tennessee:  Deliberating jurors made an average num-
ber of 4.78 references to their copies, and 99% found
the instructions “clear,” and 87% “very clear.”  Judges
report no significant problems in preparing and fur-
nishing each juror a copy.54
CONCLUSION
Many years ago, United States Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis praised the value of experimentation: “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”55 This survey of work on innovations to the
traditional jury trial underscores Justice Brandeis’s point. The
combined insights from pilot programs, field experiments, and
laboratory research on jury trial innovations show the benefits
that can derive from systematic evaluation of proposed trial
reforms. 
The willingness, if not the insistence, that changes in the tra-
ditional jury trial format intended to benefit the decision mak-
ers be subjected to evaluations demonstrates wisdom and con-
fidence.  Jury reforms have the best chance to succeed and
become part of a new tradition if subjected to the kind of sys-
tematic studies summarized here.  Today’s jurors deserve no
less if they are to have the tools they need to better understand
and decide today’s cases.  
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6. We use the word “permit” to refer to the practice of letting jurors
submit questions during trial; we use the word “allow” to refer to the
decision to answer a juror’s question or let a witness to answer it. 
7. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 564 (“When questions are not
asked after being formulated by a juror, he/she may become upset
with one of the parties, especially the one objecting to his/her ques-
tions [even though] the objections to the questions are made out-
side of the jury’s presence”).
8. The Arizona rule authorizing the practice of juror questioning in
civil cases specifies that “Jurors shall be permitted to submit to the
court written questions directed to witnesses or the court.
Opportunity shall be given to counsel to object to such questions
out of the presence of the jury.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, for
good cause the court may prohibit or limit the submission of ques-
tions to witnesses.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 39(b)(10).  Consistent with this
language, the standard practice in Arizona is to permit juror ques-
tions and jurors were so instructed in all 50 of the cases we studied. 
9. The Arizona Supreme Court authorized the taping of jury discus-
sions and deliberations in these 50 trials as part of an evaluation of
another jury innovation: permitting jurors to discuss the case in
the course of the trial.  The results of that evaluation are reported
in Shari S. Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth
Murphy, Jury Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 U. ARIZ. L. REV 1 (2003). 
American courts have rediscovered what was familiar atcommon law.1 A majority of modern courts now sanc-tion the practice of permitting jurors to submit ques-
tions during trial.2 A procedure that permits jurors to submit
questions is consistent with the view that juror questions can
promote juror understanding of the evidence3 and fits with
other jury innovations, like note taking and written jury
instructions, that aim at optimizing juror comprehension and
recall.  Nonetheless, the practice of permitting juror questions
has not received unanimous endorsement and adoption.4 Even
in jurisdictions that authorize juror questions during trial, the
ultimate decision as to whether or not to permit them is gen-
erally left to the discretion of the trial court,5 and it is unclear
how pervasive the practice actually is across jurisdictions in
which juror questions are authorized.  
Some judges have been reluctant to permit juror questions
because of concerns that jurors will frequently submit inad-
missible questions that the judge cannot answer or allow6 a
witness to address, that the jurors may be offended when their
questions are not answered,7 and that jurors may come up with
their own answers that will unfairly prejudice one party or the
other. A unique opportunity allowed us to examine the fre-
quency and nature of jurors’ unanswered questions and to
assess how jurors responded.  We collected all of the questions
that jurors submitted during 50 civil trials in Arizona, where
jurors are regularly permitted to submit questions during
trial.8 A distinctive feature of the research is that we were able
not only to identify the questions that the judge declined to
allow, but also to observe juror reactions during trial and delib-
erations as the jurors learned that their question would not be
allowed.9 This examination both addresses the concerns
raised about unanswered juror questions and gives judges who
have not yet permitted juror questions a preview of the kind of
questions jurors are likely to submit that judges may not be
Jurors’ Unanswered Questions
Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, and Beth Murphy
20 Court Review - Spring 2004
                                    
10. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question
Asking: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121
(1994) 
11. Id. at 142-143, Table 13.
12. Mary Dodge, Should Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Cases? at
40 (unpublished report submitted to the Colorado Supreme
Court’s Jury System Committee, 2002).
13. See, e.g., Warren D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation
of Witnesses, CBA REC. 12 (Feb. 1987).
14. Howard Ross Cabot & Christopher S. Coleman, Arizona Jury
Reform:  A View From the Trenches, ARIZ. J. (July 12, 1999).
15. See, e.g., Mark Frankel, Jurors Questioning Witnesses, 60 WISC. BAR
BULL. 23 (Feb. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Leonard B. Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven
Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second
Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 476, Appendix D (1985); for a
comprehensive review of findings in several studies, see Gregory
E. Mize & Christopher J. Connelly, Jury Trial Innovations:
Charting a Rising Tide, Spring 2004 COURT REVIEW at 4, 5-6.
17. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in
Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256
(1996).
18. See supra note 7.
19. See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 17.
20. For a detailed description of these procedures, see Diamond et al.,
supra note 9, at 17.
able to allow witnesses to answer. 
Before turning to this analysis of the unanswered questions,
we briefly review the claimed advantages and disadvantages of
permitting juror questions in light of the available evidence.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JUROR 
QUESTIONS
The primary claim made in favor of permitting juror ques-
tions is that it promotes juror understanding of the evidence.
To the extent that jurors are like students in their attempts to
understand the material being presented to them at trial,
answers to juror questions, like those given to students in a
classroom, offer the opportunity to correct sources of confu-
sion, clarify misunderstandings, and improve comprehension
and recall.  Some support for this proposition comes from a
national field experiment in which 160 cases in 33 states were
randomly assigned to permit or not permit juror questions.10
Jurors who were permitted to submit questions rated them-
selves as better informed than those who were not permitted to
submit questions.11 Similarly, in a Colorado field experiment
involving 239 criminal trials, jurors who were permitted to
submit questions were more likely to agree that they had suffi-
cient information to reach a correct decision.12
Another potential advantage of juror questions is that they
can signal counsel, as they do an instructor in a classroom, that
some issues need to be addressed further.  It is unclear how
often this occurs, but judges who have permitted juror ques-
tions13 and attorneys who have tried cases in which questions
were permitted14 report instances in which the juror questions
assisted attorneys in presenting their cases clearly.  Similarly,
judges report that jurors appear more attentive and involved
when questions are permitted.15
Judges who have experimented with juror questions have
generally become more enthusiastic about permitting juror
questions after trying out the procedure.16 Jurors too report
satisfaction with the opportunity to submit questions.17
Critics of juror questioning have suggested that permitting
juror questions might upset court decorum and consume
unnecessary court time.  Judges who permit juror questions
generally address those concerns by instructing jurors at the
beginning of the trial that they can write down a question and
submit it to the judge through the bailiff.  The judge then con-
sults with the attorneys out of the presence of the jury, usually
at a sidebar, and determines whether to ask the witness the
juror’s question.  If proper, the judge puts the question to the
witness.  Attorneys are per-
mitted to ask any necessary
follow-up questions.  This
procedure handles juror ques-
tions efficiently, minimizing
the additional time that juror
questions may require.
A separate set of concerns,
and our focus in this article, is
on juror reactions to the ques-
tions they submit that are not
answered.18 Do jurors react
unfavorably if their questions
are not answered, taking offense or experiencing unnecessary
embarrassment?  Are questions rejected because jurors become
argumentative, losing their objectivity and becoming advo-
cates?  Do jurors draw inappropriate inferences when the court
does not  allow a juror question?  Juror surveys find no evi-
dence to support these concerns,19 but these self-reports about
socially undesirable reactions may not fully capture what
occurs in the jury room.  The Arizona Filming Project made it
possible for us to examine the questions that jurors submitted
during trial that the judge was unable to allow and to assess
how jurors actually handled the lack of a response.  We begin
by briefly describing the Arizona Filming Project and then turn
to the unanswered juror questions. 
THE ARIZONA FILMING PROJECT
The Pima County Superior Court, with the endorsement
and support of the Arizona Supreme Court, approved a novel
experiment in Tucson to evaluate the Arizona innovation that
permits jurors to discuss the evidence among themselves dur-
ing the trial.  The study involved videotaping discussions and
deliberations. The project required an elaborate set of permis-
sions and security procedures.20 In each case in the study, we
obtained permission from the judge, jurors, litigants, and
attorneys.  For each case, the entire trial was videotaped from
opening statements to closing arguments and jury instruc-
tions. In the jury rooms two unobtrusive cameras and micro-
phones were mounted at ceiling level. An on-site technician
taped the conversations in the jury room whenever at least two
jurors were present. We drew on the trial videotapes to develop
a detailed “road map” for each trial. Quasi-transcripts were cre-
ated for all juror discussion periods and transcripts were pre-
pared for all deliberation periods.  They allowed detailed
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21. Nicole M. Waters of the National Center for State Courts provided
figures for all completed jury trials in Pima County, Arizona dur-
ing the year 2001: 62% were motor vehicle cases, 8% medical mal-
practice, 23% were other tort cases, and  6% were contract cases.
The plaintiff win rate was 64%. Awards ranged from $2,009 to
$2,472,163 with a median award of $31,165.
22. Wolfson, supra note 13, at 17 (“the great majority of questions
were serious, to the point, and relevant”) (Feb. 1987); Frankel,
supra note 15, at 24 (“the questions asked are thoughtful, perti-
nent, respectful and to the point”). For a researcher’s analysis of
juror questions submitted during trials and deliberations, see
Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or
Not to Ask, That Is the Question,” 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003).
23. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in
Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question
Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV 231, 252 (1988) (83 percent);
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 17, at 141, Table 12 (72 percent in
civil cases, 86 percent in criminal cases); Paula Hannaford & G.
Thomas Munsterman, Final Report for the Massachusetts Project
on Innovative Jury Trial Practices at 4 (2001)(77 percent); Neil P.
Cohen & Daniel R. Cohen, Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1 (2003)(“judges reported that jurors’ questions were ‘gen-
erally appropriate.’. . . [and] propounded them to the witness ‘as
is’ most of the time.”); AOC State of New Jersey Jury
Subcommittee, Report on Pilot Project Allowing Juror Questions
(unpublished AOC Report, 2000) (over three-quarters of the
questions were asked), reported in Mott, supra note 22, at 1104-
1105 (2003); Dodge, supra note 12, at 22 (judges in a pilot study
allowed 76 percent of the questions submitted by jurors).
24. The length of the trial was the sum of the number of hours for
each day of trial from the time the trial began to the time the trial
ended for the day until jurors began their deliberations.
25. (p<.01). This correlation is based on the 47 cases for which we
have both the allowed questions and the disallowed questions.
For three cases, we did not have access to the files of jury ques-
tions and therefore could identify only the juror questions that
the judge allowed a witness to answer.
26. We will focus on the questions that judges allowed witnesses to
answer in another article.
27. The correlation between number of disallowed questions and
length of trial was .34 (p<.05); for allowed questions and length
of trial the correlation was .54 (p<.01). 
28. Jurors instructed that they could discuss the case during trial sub-
mitted an average of 4.11 disallowed questions, and jurors
admonished not to discuss the case submitted an average of 4.5
disallowed questions (t = 0.25, p<.82). 
analyses of the content of juror
discussions and deliberations.
We also obtained copies of all
questions submitted during the
trial or during deliberations,
including those that the judge
did not answer or allow a witness
to answer.
The sample of 50 cases consisted of 26 (52%) motor vehicle
cases, 17 (34%) non-motor vehicle tort cases, 4 (8%) medical
malpractice cases, and 3 (6%) contract cases, a distribution
that is nearly identical to the breakdown for civil jury trials for
the Pima County Superior Court for the 1996-97 fiscal year
and the 2001 calendar year.  The tort cases varied from the
common rear-end collision with a claim of soft-tissue injury to
cases involving severe and permanent injury or death.
Plaintiffs received an award in 65% of the cases.  Awards
ranged from $1,000 to $2.8 million dollars, with a median
award of $25,500.21
The Questions that Jurors Submit 
Judges in other jurisdictions who permit juror questions
report that the questions jurors submit are generally appropri-
ate.22 Nonetheless, the rules of evidence bar a variety of ques-
tions on grounds of relevance and form as well as more tech-
nical bases.  It would be astounding indeed if laypersons lim-
ited their inquiries to legally acceptable grounds and always
expressed their inquiries in legally acceptable terms.   Several
surveys and experiments with juror questions indicate that
judges typically allow witnesses to answer between 72% and
86% of jurors’ questions, leaving 14% to 28% unanswered.23
In the Arizona Filming Project, jurors submitted questions
during 48 of the 50 trials.  In half of the trials, they submitted
10 or fewer questions, with an average of 17.5 per trial.  Across
all cases, jurors submitted an average of less than 1 question
(.76) per hour of trial.24 The number of questions submitted
by the jurors during a trial increased with the length of the trial
(r = .54).25 One jury submitted 110 questions, almost twice
the number submitted in any other trial.  Significantly, the trial
in which this occurred was 77.5 hours in length, amounting to
an average of 1.4 questions per hour.   
Judges allowed answers to 76% of the jurors’ 820 questions.
The questions that the judges allowed were consistent with the
observations from previous reports that jurors generally submit
appropriate and relevant questions.  For example, the jurors
directed nearly half of their questions to expert witnesses, typ-
ically attempting to clarify their testimony or to understand the
bases for their opinions.26 The juror questions that judges
allowed ranged from simple questions about definitions, such
as “What is a tear of the meniscus?” (for a physician) and
“What does the ‘reasonable psychological probability’ mean?”
(for a psychologist who testified using the phrase), to more
complex attempts by jurors to understand the inferences made
by the witness, such as “Is his post-traumatic stress a result of
the confrontation, or a result from his childhood?  Specifically,
could his breakdown be from another accident?” and “Not
knowing how he was sitting, or his weight, how can you be sure
he hit his knee?” (for an engineer testifying about an accident
reconstruction).  But what about the questions that the judge
did not answer or permit the witness to answer?  We turn now
to an analysis of those unanswered questions and to jurors’
reactions when no response was forthcoming. 
Disallowed Juror Questions
In 39 of the 50 trials, judges were presented with at least
one question that they did not allow a witness to answer. In
half the cases, judges rejected 2 or fewer juror questions dur-
ing trial.  Both allowed and disallowed questions occurred
more frequently in longer trials.27 The opportunity to discuss
the evidence during trial did not significantly influence the
rate of submitting either allowed or disallowed questions.28
After examining all of the questions that jurors submitted,
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29. Two coders independently categorized the questions, making use
of 15 total categories.  Overall reliability for these categorizations
was modest, weighted kappa = .67 (1.0 indicates perfect reliabil-
ity, zero indicates pure chance agreement).  This value increased
as the two coders gained experience and after they discussed dis-
agreements part-way through coding (weighted kappa on a sub-
set of 56 questions coded post-discussion = .74).  For the cate-
gories listed in Table 1, the coders typically agreed more often
than they disagreed: just two had percent agreement rates below
50% (Definitions/Miscellaneous facts, Parties’ mental state).  
30. Judges allowed witnesses to answer all juror questions in three
categories that are not represented in Table 1.  The questions in
these categories were generally directed toward the experts and
involved 1) extent of injury or damage, 2) basis for diagnosis or
treatment, and 3) credentials or experience of the expert.  
31. See also Mott, supra note 22, at Table 3, 1125 (identifying a simi-
lar set of juror questions, which she labeled “common practices”). 
32. Shari S. Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Juror Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics , 87 VA. L. REV.1857 (2001).
33. Id. at 1909; jurors do not intuitively recognize the collateral
source rule.
we identified 15 types of questions. 29 The breakdown for the
12 categories that produced instances of disallowed questions
appears in Table 1.30
Many of the questions that the judges disallowed reflect
commonsense ways of reasoning based on information that is
excluded under the rules of evidence.  Thus, a number of these
questions centered on a search for a comparison that could
assist the juror in evaluating the plausibility of the plaintiff’s
claims.  The first and most frequent category consisted of what
we termed “Standards”—questions that sought information on
how others might view the present circumstances, essentially
inviting witnesses to give jurors a standard by which to judge
the case (n = 43 questions).31 We subdivided this category into
requests for legal and other standards.  Examples of requests for
legal standards were inquiries such as, “Who was cited in this
accident?” or “Is the defendant required to have his vision and
hearing tested in order to renew his driver’s license, and has he
done so?”  In all such questions, jurors sought to know whether
one of the parties had done something legally improper that
bore a relationship to the conflict being decided.  Examples of
other standards asked witnesses about how the same or similar
circumstances affected people
other than the plaintiff who
were, or could have been,
involved in the incident that
led to trial.  Thus, several juror
questions asked about whether
other passengers in a plaintiff’s
vehicle were also injured (or
whether the defendant was
injured).  Likewise, in a case
involving an alleged infliction
of emotional distress, jurors
asked a non-party witness how
the defendant treated other
people with whom he came in
contact.  These two types of standards questions accounted for
about one-fifth of all disallowed questions. 
A second frequent type of excluded question concerned
jurors’ attempts to obtain information on the character and/or
credibility of the witness.  Although jurors are charged with
evaluating the credibility of witnesses and jurors asked many
questions bearing on credibility that the judge allowed wit-
nesses to answer, the jurors also asked disallowed questions
that could produce potentially prejudicial information, e.g.,
“Has [the plaintiff] been in any other lawsuit considering the
number of accidents he has been involved in?” (directed to the
plaintiff) or called for hearsay, e.g., “Does the [Plaintiff] have
any idea why his employer had an Independent Medical
Examination conducted [on him]?” Some disallowed ques-
tions asked witnesses to offer opinions or to answer questions
when no foundation had been laid that the witness had first-
hand knowledge or asked the witness to draw conclusions that
the jury was charged with making: e.g., “There are differences
between your testimony and that of the plaintiff.  Which one
is telling the truth?”    
Charged with compensating the plaintiff in a civil case,
jurors sometimes interpreted their mandate more broadly than
the law envisions and posed questions that attempted to
explore legally irrelevant financial considerations.  Consistent
with prior analyses of this data set, jurors in civil cases were
interested in the insurance status of both the plaintiff and the
defendant.32 For example, jurors may express concern about
overcompensating plaintiffs who have already received pay-
ments from insurance companies33 or they may wonder
whether the defendant will be paying any award out of pocket.
Insurance questions alone constituted 12% of all disallowed
questions, with jurors posing 23 questions in 12 trials; in 4 of
Spring 2004 - Court Review 23
Question Type N
Percent 
(of total not
allowed)
Standards
Legal standards
Other standards 
43
27
16
22
14
8
Character or credibility 
of witness
24 12
Legally irrelevant financial issues
Insurance coverage
Attorneys fees
25
23
2
13
12
1
Litigation management 13 7
Definitions and miscellaneous facts 27 14
Cause of the injury 24 12
Parties’ mental state 18 9
Predictions about future injury 6 3
Other topics or unclear 17 9
TABLE 1: TYPES OF QUESTIONS JUDGES DISALLOWED
Many of the 
questions that the
judges disallowed
reflect common-
sense ways of
reasoning based
on information
that is excluded
under the rules of
evidence.
             
34. We did not have access to the sidebar conversations in which the
attorneys had the opportunity to voice objections, and we have
not attempted to identify the rationale for excluding each of the
disallowed questions.  We note, however, that the judges were
typically generous in permitting witnesses to answer juror ques-
tions even when the wording of the question was somewhat awk-
ward or unartful.  We suspect that such instances occurred when
the question did not draw an objection from either attorney.
these trials, jurors submitted
multiple inquiries (2 questions
in two cases, 4 in one case, 7 in
another), sometimes asking
essentially the same question
in different guises (e.g., “Does
the plaintiff have insurance
coverage?” and “Who paid the
chiropractor bill?”).  Jurors
also occasionally asked about
attorneys’ fees, generally recog-
nizing that the plaintiff would
not receive the full amount of
any compensatory award they
made. 
A fourth source of disallowed questions consisted of
inquiries about how the lawsuit itself had been or was being
managed (n = 13 questions, 7% of all disallowed)—for exam-
ple, “When did you initiate this lawsuit?” and “How did you
come up with your damage figure?” (directed at plaintiffs in
different cases).  
We also identified instances of questions close to the central
controversies in the cases (i.e., establishing what happened,
negligence, liability, damages, etc.), but which, for a variety of
possible reasons, the judge did not allow.  Fourteen percent of
questions asked a witness for definitions or to explain some
fact about what happened (e.g., “Was the impact in a forward
or rearward direction?”; “How many people were in each
car?”), but were not allowed, presumably because no founda-
tion had been laid that the witness had firsthand knowledge
and, thus, was competent to answer the question.  In 24 cases
(12%), jurors asked for information that might illuminate the
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (e.g., “Can we see a picture of
what the plaintiff looked like before the accident?” or “What
percent of your current problems are a result of this acci-
dent?”); and in 18 cases, their questions touched on the men-
tal state of the parties, including questions about potential neg-
ligence, recklessness, or intent (e.g., “How long did the plain-
tiff wait at the intersection before entering?” or whether a
defendant had posted a sign warning of a potentially danger-
ous condition).  In 6 cases, the jurors asked witnesses to fore-
cast what the plaintiff’s injuries would be like in the future
(e.g., how long it might take a psychotherapist to relieve an
anxiety disorder).
A variety of reasons in addition to those we noted above
may explain why some questions were not posed to wit-
nesses.34 In some instances, the question was asked too late or
too early so that it was offered at the end of testimony by the
wrong witness.  When a later witness testified who could
address the issue, one of the attorneys generally followed up.
Other disallowed questions called for speculation; were
expressed in a form that made them objectionable, e.g., “Are
you being paid to testify here today?” (asked of an expert); or
were simply unclear about what the juror was asking, e.g., a
juror wanted to know “What does ‘bodiar’ the witness entitle
the lawyer to do?” (The juror probably meant “voir dire” but
was unable to accurately repeat the phrase he had just heard
and wanted to understand.)  In other instances, the question
would have been appropriate for one witness, but not for
another, and it was not clear when the question was submitted
and which witness was the target of the question.  Finally, on
a few occasions, the question was directed to an appropriate
witness and submitted at the appropriate time and the ques-
tion appeared to be admissible, but the witness was not
allowed to answer it.  For example, in one case a juror wanted
to ask the plaintiff how long he was stopped at the stop sign
before the collision occurred.  The plaintiff had already testi-
fied that he had come to a stop and an issue in the case was
how fast he had been going when the collision took place.
When No Immediate Answer Was Given
We turn now to the aftermath of these questions: how the
judge and the jury responded to the questions that the judge
did not allow the witness to answer.
Judicial Responses: The judge formally acknowledged less
than a third (32%) of the 197 juror questions that were disal-
lowed (see Figure 1).  The tendency to acknowledge or not
acknowledge questions was typically, but not always, consis-
tent within the same trial.  In 14 trials, the judge acknowl-
edged no juror question (range: 1 to 16 questions); in 11 cases,
the judged acknowledged all of the questions in some way
(range: 1 to 6 questions); and in 14 trials the judge acknowl-
edged some but not others (e.g., in one case, the judge
explained that insurance was not relevant to the jurors’ deci-
sion but said nothing when jurors wanted to know if anyone
else in the plaintiff’s vehicle had been injured).  
Acknowledgment of the jurors’ questions took many forms.
Judges sometimes said only, “Some questions were objected to
for one reason or another,” or “Some questions cannot be
answered.”  In several instances, the judge informed the jury
that one of the submitted questions would be more appropri-
ate for a later witness or would be addressed in later testimony.
In another instance when jurors asked a witness to solve a con-
flict between his testimony and that of another witness, the
judge explained that it was the jury’s job to make decisions
about such conflicts.  Finally, judges also explicitly cited the
law in explaining why a question would not be permitted, say-
ing, for instance, that a given issue was not “relevant” or, in
one case, that the “Federal Rules of Evidence” did not allow
the question.  Explanations about legal constraints on ques-
tions could be short (e.g., “The jury cannot consider insurance
in its decision”), but occasionally involved lengthy recaps
about the specific issues the jury was to solve (e.g., who was
“legally obligated to make payment for [the plaintiff’s] medical
bills and . . . repair of the vehicle”), including reminders that
who paid the bills was “outside your relevant area of inquiry as
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35. We coded as follows: 1 = no discussion; 2 =  explicit acknowl-
edgment that the information is unnecessary or irrelevant; 3 =
wistful or begrudging acceptance of the lack of information (e.g.,
acknowledging they were unlikely to get an answer but still want-
ing to know—we combined this category with no. 2 to describe
the jurors as accepting the non-answer); 4 = explicitly negative
reactions (e.g., explicit annoyance, complaint, or statements
insisting the information is relevant); 5 = attempts to give or sug-
gest an answer to the question (including by not countering an
answer developed during a previous discussion period—to count,
the answer or its relevance to the case had to be undisputed by
other jurors).  Two coders demonstrated high reliability in assign-
ing text to these categories, weighted kappa = .79.
36. F (1, 157) = 2.77, p<.10.  This test statistic reflects controls for the
fact that cases differed in the extent to which judges acknowl-
edged juror questions (“non-independence of observations” in
statistical parlance).
37. The case is discussed in more detail in the text at note 39.
far as the decision that you have to make in this case.”
The judicial tendency not to acknowledge disallowed juror
questions explicitly or to explain why they were not being
posed to the witness may be attributable to two factors.  First,
the judges in all of these cases gave the jurors a pre-instruction
on juror questions, warning them that not all of their questions
could be addressed:   
If I decide the question is proper, an answer will be
provided at the earliest logical opportunity.  Keep in
mind, however, that the rules of evidence or other rules
of law may prevent some questions from being asked.
I will apply the same legal standards to your questions
as I do to the questions asked by the lawyers.
Jurors were thus on notice that some of their questions
would not be answered.  In addition, an explicit response to an
irrelevant question might unnecessarily require the judge to
expose the rest of the jury to that question.  As we shall see,
there may be some value in providing at least a perfunctory
acknowledgment of each unanswered question when the occa-
sion arises.
Jurors’ Reactions When Questions Were Disallowed: After an
issue is raised by a juror and the juror’s question is not
answered, the issue may simply be dropped and not discussed
among the jurors at all, or it may receive further attention from
the jurors. That further attention can take one of three forms.
First, a juror may mention having posed a question, note that
there was no answer, and accept the lack of an answer without
complaint or even with understanding (e.g., by asserting that
the issue must, in fact, be irrelevant).  Second, consistent with
the worries of those apprehensive about juror questions, the
jury may chafe at the non-response, casting the judge’s decision
in a negative light.  Finally, jurors not given an answer to their
question may consider what the answer actually is.  We coded
all responses into categories to reflect these responses.35 Figure
1 describes the frequency of these responses.
The most common reaction from jurors was no reaction at
all, either during the trial itself or during deliberations.  Jurors
referred, in one way or another, to only 38% of their disallowed
questions.  Jurors were somewhat more likely to discuss a ques-
tion that the judge acknowledged than to discuss a question
when the judge had said nothing:  45% of acknowledged ques-
tions received some mention, whereas only 34% of unacknowl-
edged questions did so.36 In most instances, however, whether
or not the juror’s question was acknowledged, any discussion
that followed was limited.  Typically, conversations lasted no
more than 10 “turns” (a turn ends when another juror speaks).
The exceptions arose when the topic was insurance or attor-
neys fees, when conversation continued for up to 80 turns. One
additional case that drew an extended discussion occurred
when the jurors submitted several questions on the same topic
without receiving an answer.37
When jurors did mention an unanswered question, almost
half (49%) of the time the jury either explicitly accepted the
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38. Twenty-five (25) of these occasions occurred during discussion
periods and 11 during deliberations.
39. The legal issue was not dealt with in the jury instructions at the
end of the trial, and the jurors discussed it during deliberations as
well as during the trial.
40. Jurors were able to answer three additional unanswered insurance
questions by examining bills that were included among the case
exhibits.
lack of response or expressed
no complaint and swiftly
turned to other topics for dis-
cussion.38 In some of these
reactions, jurors reminded
others that the judge said the
information was not relevant
or pointed out, as one juror
did, that “it doesn’t do any
good to guess.”  In others,
they explained to their fellow
jurors why they had submit-
ted a question but then
expressed neither satisfaction
nor dissatisfaction or com-
mented in some other neutral
way.  In short, all such jurors appeared to “move on,” irrespec-
tive of whether they might have preferred to have an answer.  
Overt annoyance or displeasure with the judge’s failure to
pose the question was exceedingly rare (see Figure 1):  we
identified just seven responses (4%) from three cases as explic-
itly negative; four of these seven complaints came from a sin-
gle jury and involved a single issue; two others came from a
different jury; and the remaining one from a third jury.  The
jury expressing four complaints was deciding a case involving
the potential negligence of a business. The jurors wanted to
know if the law required the business to post a sign in the
establishment and whether a sign had been posted, believing
that the answers might signal negligent behavior.  The judge
did not acknowledge the jurors’ two related questions, either
the first time or the second time they were submitted.
Although persistent, the “complaints” were phrased in mild
terms (e.g., one juror said that she was “shocked” that the
judge would not answer the questions).39 In both of the other
cases involving juror complaints, a single juror simply
expressed the belief that the information that had been
requested was relevant, even if the judge had ruled otherwise.
For example, a juror asked if either of the two motorists
involved in a collision had received citations, and the judge
said that the question was not relevant.  A juror expressed the
opinion that it would be pertinent to find who’s at fault.  The
disagreement here may be with the terminology.  Arguably, a
citation in the accident is relevant, but is excluded because it
is both hearsay and potentially prejudicial.   
Finally, we identified a number of instances in which jurors
attempted to answer a question the judge had not allowed.  We
found 31 such occurrences (involving 16% of all disallowed
questions).   In 12 instances, jurors suggested answers by
drawing reasonable inferences directly from the evidence.  For
example, one case involved someone seated in the rear of a
vehicle who claimed he was injured in an accident after hitting
the car’s front seat.  A juror submitted a question about
whether it was likely that the other passenger riding in the
back would also have hit the front seat.  When this juror men-
tioned the unanswered inquiry to her fellow jurors during dis-
cussion, another juror informed her that the laws of physics
(to which experts had testified) applied equally to all passen-
gers.  Jurors drew on their own experience or beliefs to address
10 additional unanswered questions about insurance or attor-
ney’s fees. 40 For example, a juror who submitted an unan-
swered question about insurance speculated that the plaintiff
probably did not pay much for the accident because he proba-
bly had disability insurance.  
The remaining answers to inquiries came from jurors’ per-
sonal experiences or expertise or from a combination of per-
sonal expertise and reasoning based on what they had heard in
court.  For example, the judge in one case did not allow a wit-
ness to answer a question about the muscular side effects of a
steroidal medication a plaintiff had been taking.  Later in delib-
erations, when the juror who submitted the question reintro-
duced it, mentioning that it had been left unanswered, another
juror explained that the steroid in question was an anti-inflam-
matory, not an agent that affected muscle tone.  In a few
instances, jurors’ guesses about answers reflected conclusions
one of the parties likely wished to avoid.  For example, a juror
in one case asked why a plaintiff was no longer working in the
area in which she had been trained; the juror later wondered if
the reason was because the plaintiff had done “something bad”
in her prior job. Nearly all (30 of 31) of the unanswered ques-
tions that jurors discussed involved the kinds of issues and
responses that naturally occur during deliberations even if a
juror has not submitted a question on the topic.  In only one
instance did a juror draw a conclusion from the fact that the
judge did not answer the juror’s question.  In an automobile
accident involving claims for both personal and property dam-
age, a juror asked whether the plaintiff’s vehicle had a particu-
lar design feature and the judge did not acknowledge the ques-
tion.  The juror said, “I got no answer, so evidently it’s not [part
of the design].” No acknowledged juror question, whether the
acknowledgment was perfunctory or more complete, produced
this kind of inference.
Juror attempts to address the unanswered questions varied
substantially across the types of questions posed.  When jurors
discussed unanswered questions they had submitted about
standards, jurors attempted to answer only 15% of them.  In
contrast, when they discussed unanswered insurance ques-
tions, jurors attempted to answer 79% of them (11 of the 14
they discussed at all).  Jurors also suggested answers to both of
the inquiries about attorney fees (concluding in one case that
attorneys “usually” got half the award, and in the other that it
could be anywhere between 25% and 45%).  These responses
to questions on legally irrelevant financial topics account for
almost half of the answers (42%) that jurors offered one
another when a question was disallowed.  As we have previ-
ously observed, talk and speculation in the jury room about
the insurance of the parties are common even when jurors do
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41. See Diamond & Vidmar, supra at note 32.
42. Id. at 1910 for a description of potential jury instructions on the
topic of insurance.
43. Jurors are told: “If a particular question is not asked, do not guess
why or what the answer might have been.”  
44. Again, it is significant that almost half of the answers jurors
offered concerned the topic of insurance or attorneys’ fees. See
generally Diamond & Vidmar, supra at note 32.  
45. Civil Trial Practice Standard Part One: The Jury, Standard 4
(1998).
46. Id. at 4b. (i), (ii), and (iii).
47. Id. at 4b x.
not submit questions about insurance,41 reinforcing the notion
that jurors should be specifically instructed on the irrelevance
of insurance in tort cases.42
Summary of Findings
As our survey of juror questions during trial indicates, more
than three-quarters (76%) of the questions that the jurors sub-
mit are legally appropriate. Jurors not only appreciate the
opportunity to submit questions, but also formulate relevant
questions to assist them in evaluating the evidence.  Our analy-
sis of the questions jurors submit that judges do not allow
under current evidentiary rules reveals that those questions are
likely to concern topics like legal standards and insurance, top-
ics that reflect commonsense ways of reasoning and common
knowledge but that evidentiary rules preclude jurors from
obtaining information about in reaching their verdicts.
Although jurors appreciate the opportunity to submit ques-
tions, they rarely express disappointment or even surprise
when the judge does not supply them with an answer.  The
preliminary instruction that judges in Arizona use informs
jurors that they will not always be able to receive answers to
the questions they submit, and popular lay understanding of
how trials work probably prepared the jurors to accept that
outcome for most of their unanswered questions.  Thus, the
concern with juror reactions to unanswered questions did not
materialize.  We did observe a few occasions when jurors
expressed annoyance with the failure to respond to a juror
question.  Significantly, only one instance of expressed annoy-
ance occurred when the judge gave even a perfunctory non-
specific acknowledgment that the question could not be
allowed.  Although jurors were somewhat more likely to dis-
cuss an unanswered question when the judge acknowledged it,
that discussion was generally brief, except when the topic was
insurance or attorneys’ fees.
Finally, when the judge did not allow the jurors to obtain an
answer directly, a minority of the juries did attempt to answer
their own questions.  In doing this, the jurors technically vio-
lated the pre-instruction admonition not to attempt to answer
questions that the judge declined to allow.43 Importantly,
many of the same questions and answers that jurors supplied
may have emerged even in the absence of a juror question for-
mally submitted by a juror during the trial (i.e., during the
normal course of deliberations in which jurors regularly use
one another to resolve sources of ambiguity).44
Implications for Procedures Used When Juror Questions Are
Permitted
The procedures used when jurors are permitted to submit
questions generally give counsel the opportunity to object to a
juror question outside the hearing of the jury and permit attor-
neys to ask appropriate follow-up questions when a juror ques-
tion is answered. There is also
agreement that the jurors
should be told in advance that
it will not be possible to allow
some of their questions to be
asked. As the results here
show, jurors generally under-
stand and accept the legiti-
macy of these procedures.  
Cautionary Instructions:
Less agreement exists on the
standards for the instructions
that jurors should receive
about how and when they
should submit their questions,
other than the question should be submitted in writing.  A cur-
rent Standard of the American Bar Association45 supports juror
questions for witnesses, but suggests that a series of cautionary
instructions be given, including a warning that “Questions
should be reserved for important points only”; that “The sole
purpose of juror questions is to clarify the testimony, not to
comment on it or express any opinion about it”; and that
“Jurors are not to argue with the witness.”46 The instructions
received by the jurors we studied did not include any of these
warnings.  The 820 questions we reviewed in these 50 cases,
including the 197 that the judge did not allow, provided no
instances of jurors submitting frivolous questions and only a
few that could be characterized as argumentative.  (E.g., a juror
submitted a question for the plaintiff asking how he would
work full-time after the trial.  The plaintiff was claiming that
the accident had temporarily impaired his ability to work and
the jurors were skeptical about that claim.) Indeed, almost all
of the questions appeared to reflect serious attempts to under-
stand the evidence and to help the jurors assess how it could
assist them to evaluate the competing claims of the parties.
Even without such cautionary admonitions, jurors censored
their own potential questions.  On average, the jurors dis-
cussed almost 2 potential questions per case (1.7) that they
then decided not to submit.  Their restrained behavior suggests
that jurors need not be cautioned that they should limit their
instructions to important ones.  The danger of including such
cautionary instructions is that they will have a chilling effect
on jurors’ questions, discouraging jurors from attempting to
resolve the areas of confusion that the opportunity to submit
questions was designed to help them deal with. A similar issue
also arises with the recommendation from the Civil Trial
Practice Standards that juror questions be signed.47 In
Arizona, jurors are instructed not to sign their name when they
submit a question on the assumption that jurors should not
have to worry about appearing ignorant when they are experi-
encing some confusion.   
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48. Judicial silence led to an unwarranted inference in one case
described supra at p. 26.
49. Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 32, at 1884.
50. Id. at Section V for a full description of collaborative jury instruc-
tions.
Acknowledging Juror Questions: One decision that judges
who permit juror questions must make is what if anything to
say to a jury in response to a question that cannot be answered.
As we have seen, judges often rely primarily on their pretrial
instruction informing jurors that “the rules of evidence or
other rules of law may prevent some questions from being
asked” and say nothing further to the jurors.  That approach
avoids exposing the other members of the jury to a question
that is irrelevant or otherwise improper.  Although jurors gen-
erally do not complain about this implicit rejection of a ques-
tion, jurors do seem to appreciate it when judges offer even a
perfunctory acknowledgment that a submitted question can-
not be addressed without describing the question itself.
Moreover, that response prevents a juror from drawing an
inference about the answer to the question from the judge’s
silence.48 In a few other instances, a series of questions sub-
mitted on the same topic stimulated the judge to be more
direct and specific.  For example, jurors in one case submitted
several questions asking who owned the property where the
injury occurred.  After the third question was submitted, the
judge told the jurors, “A couple of you, Ladies and Gentlemen,
asked questions concerning [the location].  Although these are
things you may wonder about, for the purpose of what you
have to decide today, it doesn’t make any difference.” The
jurors never referred to these questions in their discussions
during trial or during their deliberations.  The approach that
this judge adopted recognizes that the jurors can be given
assistance in identifying relevant information.  In other situa-
tions, jurors may need further assistance in understanding why
a question cannot be addressed.  
An Ancillary Value
Are unanswered jury questions merely an incidental cost of
permitting jurors to submit questions?  Some additional obser-
vations suggest that even the disallowed questions have some
ancillary value.  In one case, the jurors’ early questions sug-
gested that they were trying to assess the negligence of the
defendant when the defendant had already conceded negli-
gence.  The jurors’ questions provided an occasion for the
judge to correct that misimpression in the course of denying
the jurors’ request for the irrelevant information.  Thus, even
the unanswered questions, which the judge shares with the
attorneys in deciding whether the question will be allowed,
can signal potential sources of juror confusion that the judge
or the attorneys may be able to address.
Similarly, the natural interest of jurors in insurance arises
whether or not jurors pose a question about it.49 A juror ques-
tion about insurance, however, provides a natural occasion for a
collaborative instruction from the judge that recognizes the rea-
sonableness of the jurors’ interest and helps jurors understand
why they should not be focusing on insurance.50 A full collab-
orative instruction would accurately explain why insurance is
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irrelevant (e.g., it tells nothing about negligence or how much
damage was caused) and would let jurors know that any specu-
lation about how much insurance the parties have, or even
whether or not they have any insurance, would be inaccurate.51
CONCLUSION
Most of the recent innovations in jury trials recognize that
jurors are active decision makers and adjust trial procedures to
reflect that reality.  Whether or not jurors are permitted to sub-
mit questions during trial, we know that questions are occur-
ring to them as they try to understand the evidence in antici-
pation of being charged with reaching a verdict.  Permitting
jurors to submit their questions during trial provides the
opportunity to learn what those juror questions are and to
address them when possible.  As this research indicates, even
when judges tell the jury that they cannot allow a witness to
answer a juror’s questions, the jurors generally accept the deci-
sion easily and move on.  The need to leave some juror ques-
tions unanswered offers no justification for missing the oppor-
tunity to assist jurors in reaching well-grounded decisions.
Shari Seidman Diamond is the Howard J.
Trienens Professor of Law and Professor of
Psychology at Northwestern University Law
School, and a senior research fellow at the
American Bar Foundation. She received her
Ph.D. in social psychology from Northwestern
University and her J.D. from the University of
Chicago. She has published extensively in law
reviews and behavioral science journals and has testified as an
expert on juries, trademarks, and deceptive advertising. Her writ-
ings on juries and on surveys have been cited by the United States
Supreme Court. She also practiced law (1985-87) at Sidley &
Austin, served as editor of the Law and Society Review (1989-91),
was president of the American Psychology Law Society (1987-88),
received the 1991 Award for Distinguished Research Contributions
in Public Policy from the American Psychological Association, and
was a member of the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the
Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1994-96). She has served
on advisory groups for the National Center for State Courts, the
Federal Judicial Center, and the American Bar Association. Her e-
mail address is s-diamond @law.northwestern.edu.
Mary R. Rose has been an assistant professor of
sociology and law at the University of Texas at
Austin since 2002. Between 1999 and 2002, she
was a research fellow at the American Bar
Foundation. Professor Rose’s empirical research
on juries concerns both juror decision making
as well as the process of selecting juries. In
addition, her work examines the social psychol-
ogy of justice perceptions, such as how people conceptualize fair-
ness in different settings and how people respond to perceived
unfairness. She is an editorial board member of the Law and
Society Review, serves on the Board of Trustees for the Law and
Society Association, and is a reviewer for several law and social
science journals. She received her A.B. in psychology from
Stanford University in 1991 and her Ph.D. in social psychology
from Duke University in 1998. She can be reached via email at
mrose@mail.la.utexas.edu.
Beth Murphy is the project coordinator for the
Arizona Jury Project at the American Bar
Foundation. Previously with the American
Judicature Society, she directed the study
Behind Closed Doors: A Resource Manual to
Improve Jury Deliberations, which produced a
Jury Deliberation Handbook that is used
widely by courts throughout the country. She
also coauthored Enhancing the Jury System: A Guidebook for
Jury Reform. Ms. Murphy has a master’s degree in sociology from
the University of Illinois.
51. Id.
Spring 2004 - Court Review 29
Resource Page: Focus on Jury Reform continued from page 42.
                           
The United States Supreme Court this term reassertedthe rule of law in the context of the detainees in the waron terrorism.  At the same time, this was a term of
unanswered questions.  The Court handed down several deci-
sions that had far-reaching implications that were not
addressed by the Court’s opinions.  Two cases with the greatest
practical input on the day-to-day administration of justice were
criminal cases: Crawford v. Washington,1 concerning the admis-
sibility of hearsay at criminal trials, and Blakely v. Washington,2
regarding the proper role of judges and juries in determining
aggravating factors that justify harsher sentences.  Each opin-
ion left many unresolved issues that will require further court
interpretation in future cases.
In this article, we review the Court’s decisions in criminal
cases and in habeas corpus actions challenging criminal con-
victions.  In the next issue of Court Review, we will review the
past term’s cases involving civil rights, the First Amendment,
federalism, presidential power, and civil statutory interpreta-
tion.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
In United States v. Banks,3 Justice Souter, writing for a unan-
imous Court, determined that a 15- to 20-second wait between
the time the officers knocked on the door and announced their
presence to execute a drug-trafficking search warrant and their
forced entry was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.  Several officers arrived at respondent’s apartment
to execute a drug-trafficking warrant.  The officers at the front
of the building knocked and announced themselves loudly
enough to be heard by the officers at the back.  Unbeknownst
to the officers, respondent was at home, but was in the shower
and did not hear the officers.  After waiting between 15 to 20
seconds, the officers forced entry into the apartment.  The offi-
cers found drugs and weapons during their search and respon-
dent sought to have them excluded from evidence on the
ground that the officers had waited an unreasonably short time
before forcing entry.  The Court concluded that between the
time the officers knocked on the door and the time they forced
entry, exigent circumstances arose because “15 to 20 seconds
does not seem an unrealistic guess about the time someone
would need to get in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine.”
The Court applied a “totality analysis,” specifically rejecting
the Ninth Circuit’s attempts to create a set of “sub-rules” to
govern what constitutes a reasonable amount of time.  To reach
its conclusion, the Court relied on Wilson v. Arkansas4 and
United States v. Ramirez.5 In Wilson, the Court held “the com-
mon law knock-and-announce principle is one focus of the rea-
sonableness inquiry; and we subsequently decided that
although the standard generally requires the police to
announce their intent to search before entering closed
premises, the obligation gives way when officers ‘have a rea-
sonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their pres-
ence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous
or futile or . . . would inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime by, for example, allowing destruction of evidence.’”
Ramirez stated that in exigent circumstances, officers may dam-
age the premises as is necessary for a forced entry.
In Maryland v. Pringle,6 Justice Rehnquist delivered the opin-
ion for a unanimous court, which upheld the arrest of all three
occupants of a car in which cocaine was found after each had
denied ownership of the drugs.  Respondent was one of three
occupants in a car, which was stopped by an officer for a traffic
violation.  The officer noticed a large amount of cash in the
glove compartment and a subsequent search of the vehicle
“yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five glassine
baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest.”
All three occupants of the car denied ownership of the cocaine
and money and were arrested.  After being given Miranda warn-
ings, respondent stated that the money and cocaine were his
and that the other occupants knew nothing about it.  At trial,
respondent moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds
that the officer had no probable cause to arrest him.  
The Court first noted that “[i]t is uncontested . . . that the
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies con-
taining suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a
felony had been committed.”  Thus, the only question remain-
ing is “whether the officer had probable cause to believe that
Pringle committed that crime.” The Court said that “[t]o deter-
mine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an indi-
vidual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then
decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the stand-
point of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’
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probable cause.”  The Court then analyzed the facts of the case
before it: (1) Pringle was one of the three men riding in the car
during the early hours of the morning; (2) there was $763 of
rolled-up cash in the glove compartment directly in front of
Pringle; (3) five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were found
in a place accessible to all three men; and (4) all three men
failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of
the cocaine or money.  Given these facts, the Court concluded
that it was “an entirely reasonable inference . . . that any or all
three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercise domin-
ion and control over, the cocaine.”  Therefore, a reasonable offi-
cer could conclude “that there was probable cause to believe
Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either
solely or jointly.”
Justice Breyer, writing for a six-person majority in Illinois v.
Lidster,7 concluded that a checkpoint stop to obtain informa-
tion from motorists about a hit-and-run accident, not likely
committed by any of the motorists who were stopped, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.  An unknown motorist struck
and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist; about one week later, police
implemented a highway checkpoint “to obtain more informa-
tion about the accident from the motoring public.”
Respondent was stopped at the checkpoint, arrested, and even-
tually convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol.  He
challenged his conviction, arguing that the government had
obtained much of the relevant evidence through use of a check-
point stop that violated the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court disagreed.  It concluded that the checkpoint here
differed from the one the Court found unconstitutional in
Indianapolis v. Edmund,8 because, unlike in Edmund, the “pur-
pose was not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were
committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members
of the public, for their help in providing information about a
crime in all likelihood committed by others.”  The Court states,
Edmund aside, the Fourth Amendment would not “have us
apply an Edmund-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to
brief, information-seeking highway stops of the kind now
before us.”  First, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not treat a
motorist’s car as his castle.”  Therefore, “special law enforce-
ment concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without
individualized suspicion.”  Like certain other forms of police
activity, i.e., crowd control or public safety, “an information-
seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or
lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.”  Further, the
Court noted, “information-seeking stops are less likely to pro-
voke anxiety or to prove intrusive.”  Although “the importance
of soliciting the public’s assistance is offset to some degree by
the need to stop a motorist to obtain that help . . . [t]he differ-
ence . . . is not important enough to justify an Edmund-type rule
here.”  The Court’s analysis did not end there; it also concluded
that the checkpoint stop was reasonable: (1) the Court found
that “[t]he relevant public concern was grave;” (2) it concluded
that “[t]he stop advances this grave public concern to a signif-
icant degree;” and (3) “[m]ost importantly, the stops interfered
only minimally with liberty of
the sort the Fourth Amendment
seeks to protect.”
Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of a 5-4 Court in Groh
v. Ramirez.9 It held that a war-
rant that fails to describe with
particularity the things or per-
sons to be seized is facially
invalid, even if the application
for the warrant, which was not
incorporated by reference, did
describe these things in detail.  It also concluded that the offi-
cer in charge of the search was not entitled to qualified immu-
nity because he drafted the warrant and no reasonable officer
could believe that the warrant was valid.  Petitioner Jeff Groh,
an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF), was informed that Ramirez had “a large stock of
weaponry” at his ranch.  The application for the warrant
described with particularity the items to be seized, but the war-
rant form submitted with the application, and signed by the
magistrate judge, did not.  Nor did the warrant incorporate by
reference the application.  Petitioner and other officers exe-
cuted the warrant and did not find any illegal weapons.
Ramirez filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents10 for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant must par-
ticularly describe the persons or things to be seized.  In this
case, the actual warrant completely lacked any description of
the items to be seized.  Furthermore, the Court concluded that
the more specific application did not save the warrant: “The
Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the
warrant, not in the supporting documents.”  The Court did not
decide, however, whether a detailed application that is incor-
porated by reference into the warrant would save the warrant
because that was not done in this case.  Finally, the Court deter-
mined that in light of these facts, the petitioner did not have
qualified immunity: “The answer depends on whether the right
that was transgressed was ‘clearly established’—that is,
‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his con-
duct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’”  The Court
concluded that there was no way petitioner could have believed
the warrant was sufficient.
The Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice
Rehnquist, held in United States v. Flores-Montano11 that the
government’s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at
the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and
reassemble an automobile’s gas tank.  Respondent was stopped
at the United States-Mexico border and delayed while customs
inspectors requested that a mechanic under contract with the
government come to the border station to remove respondent’s
gas tank.  The mechanic then disassembled the gas tank, and
the inspector found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks con-
cealed in the gas tank.  Respondent moved to suppress the evi-
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dence, arguing that it was
obtained in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights
because the inspectors did not
have sufficient probable cause
to conduct a search of his gas
tank.  However, according to
the Court, “the reasons that
might support a requirement
of some level of suspicion in
the case of highly intrusive
searches of the person—dig-
nity and privacy interests of
the person being searched—
simply do not carry over to
vehicles.”  Thus “[c]omplex
balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a vehi-
cle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no
place in border searches of vehicles.”  In support of its deter-
mination, the Court said that the “Government’s interest in pre-
venting the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its
zenith at the international border.”  The Court has continu-
ously determined that the “longstanding right of the sovereign
to protect itself” renders searches of persons and things rea-
sonable “simply by virtue of the fact they occur at the border.”
This interest is illustrated by the seizure of the drugs in this
case.
In Thornton v. United States,12 the Court determined that an
officer may search the passenger compartment of an automo-
bile, pursuant to New York v. Belton,13 even if he first makes
contact with the occupant after he or she has recently exited
the vehicle.  In this case, the officer, who noticed that peti-
tioner’s license tags did not match the vehicle petitioner was
driving, was not able to stop petitioner until the latter had
exited his vehicle.  Petitioner, who was acting nervously, con-
sented to a pat-down search and the officer discovered two
individual plastic baggies containing marijuana and crack
cocaine.  Petitioner was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the
squad car.  The officer then performed a search of petitioner’s
automobile and found a gun beneath the driver’s seat.
Petitioner moved to suppress the firearm as fruit of an uncon-
stitutional search.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-person majority,
began the opinion with a synopsis of the Court’s decision in
Belton.  The Court, in Belton, had determined that “‘when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of
an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.’”
In Belton, the Court relied on two justifications as set forth in
Chimel v. California:14 (1) the need to remove any weapon the
arrestee might possess or seek to use to avoid arrest; and (2)
“the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evi-
dence.”  The Court concluded that when it articulated the rule
in Belton, it placed no reliance “on the fact that the officer in
Belton ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, or initiated
contact with them while they remained within it.”
Furthermore, it did not find these factors relevant: Belton’s
rationale provides no basis “to conclude that the span of the
area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is deter-
mined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer’s
direction, or whether the officer initiated contact with him
while he remained in the car.” According to the Court, for all
practical purposes, “the arrest of a suspect who is next to a
vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and
the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside
the vehicle.”  
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but believed that
the reasoning in Chimel and Belton was inappropriate here:
petitioner was handcuffed and in the police car when the
search occurred and, therefore, the possibility that he would
grab a weapon to escape or destroy evidence was “remote in the
extreme.”  Instead, he would find the search lawful under a
more general interest: that “the car might contain evidence rel-
evant to the crime for which he was arrested.”  Justice Stevens,
dissenting, believed Belton veered away from the principles
stated in Chimel, solely for the purpose of establishing a bright-
line rule, and that it should be narrowly applied.  For anyone
who is not an actual occupant of a car, “Chimel itself provides
all the guidance that is necessary.”
In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court,15 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a 5-4 Court, held that Nevada’s “stop and identify”
statute did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.  An
officer responded to a call regarding a possible assault and
encountered petitioner, who was standing next to a parked
truck with a woman still inside the truck.  It was apparent that
the truck had been stopped quickly and that petitioner was
drunk.  Petitioner refused to give the police officer his name
and was arrested and prosecuted under Nevada’s “stop and
identify” statute, which makes it a misdemeanor for a person to
refuse to identify himself if stopped by an officer under “suspi-
cious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad.”  The
Court granted certiorari on direct appeal to address petitioner’s
contention that his conviction under Nevada’s statute violates
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  
The Court began with the statement that “’interrogation
relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the
police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.’”  In Terry v. Ohio,16 the Court “recognized that law
enforcement officers’ reasonable suspicion that a person may be
involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the per-
son for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate fur-
ther.”  The Court’s subsequent decisions make clear that “ques-
tions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted
part of many Terry stops” and, furthermore, serve important
governmental interests, i.e., whether the suspect is wanted for
another crime or has a history of mental disorder.  The Fourth
Amendment “does not impose obligations on the citizen but
instead provides rights against the government.”  Therefore,
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while “the Fourth Amendment cannot require a suspect to
answer,” it does not necessarily prevent a state from compelling
a person to identify himself during a Terry stop.  According to
the Court, “[t]he principles in Terry permit a State to require a
suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.”  As
for petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim, the Court concludes
that it need not address whether the Nevada statute’s require-
ment that a person identify himself compels a “testimonial”
communication.  It concludes that petitioner’s argument must
fail because “in this case disclosure of his name presented no
reasonable danger of incrimination.”  
Justice Stevens dissented.  He concluded that the statute was
directed only at a specific class of persons, essentially, those
that are “targets of a criminal investigation.”  These people can
be prosecuted for crime if they do not identify themselves.
Under his view, the Fifth Amendment has no exception, includ-
ing this narrow one, to its “right to remain silent.”  Justice
Breyer, also dissenting, wrote because he believed a limit to a
Terry stop, which “invalidates laws that compel responses to
police questioning,” obviously invalidates Nevada’s law.  In
Terry, the Court set forth conditions to a Terry stop, what has
become known as the “reasonable suspicion” standard.  It is
well established that a Terry detainee need not answer any
questions posed to him by a police officer and Justice Breyer
saw no compelling reason to “reject this generation-old state-
ment of the law.”
FIFTH AMENDMENT
In a 5-4 decision, the Court, in Yarborough v. Alvarado,17
decided that consideration of age and inexperience when deter-
mining whether an individual is in custody for the purposes of
Miranda is inappropriate because the test is objective and these
factors introduce a subjective element.  Respondent, a 17-year-
old, agreed to help his friend steal a car in a parking mall.  His
friend pulled a gun and shot and killed Francisco Castaneda,
who refused to relinquish possession of his vehicle.
Respondent was taken to the police station by his parents for
an “interview” and questioned for two hours outside their pres-
ence.  He was not given warnings pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona18 and eventually told the entire story to the officer,
including his role in the botched car-jacking.  Several months
later, respondent was charged with first-degree murder and
moved to suppress his statements made during the interview,
claiming he was in custody for the purposes of Miranda and,
therefore, entitled to warnings.  
The case was before the Court on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section  2254; therefore,
the Court first recognized that it could reverse only if the lower
court applied “clearly established law” in an objectively unrea-
sonable manner.  The Court concluded that the lower court’s
determination under clearly established law that respondent
was not in custody for Miranda purposes was not objectively
unreasonable.  In Thompson v. Keohane,19 the Court had articu-
lated a two-step analysis to determine whether an individual
was in custody for the purposes of Miranda: “first, what were
the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation; and,
second, given those circum-
stances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was
not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.”  The
Court concluded that in the
circumstances of the present
case, respondent was not in
custody: respondent was not
put under arrest; respondent’s parents, rather than the police,
had brought him to the station; the parents remained at the sta-
tion; and respondent was asked at least twice if he wanted to
take a break.  The Court also concluded, in the first instance,
that respondent’s age and inexperience were not factors that
should be considered in its analysis.  It said, “There is an
important conceptual difference between the Miranda custody
test and the line of cases from other contexts considering age
and experience”:  “the Miranda custody inquiry is an objective
test,” the others are not.  The Court did not wish to change the
nature of this test because the objective standard is “designed
to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a
suspect’s individual characteristics—including his age—could
be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.”
Justice Breyer, dissenting, believed it was clear that respon-
dent was in custody: a reasonable person in respondent’s cir-
cumstances would not believe he was free to leave.
Furthermore, Justice Breyer argueds that respondent’s youth
did add to his interpretation of the situation and should be con-
sidered: “[A] 17-year-old is more likely than, say, a 35-year-old,
to take a police officer’s assertion of authority to keep parents
outside the room and as an assertion of authority to keep their
child inside as well.”  Justice Breyer viewed the respondent’s
age and inexperience as objective circumstances, which were
known to the police.
In Missouri v. Seibert,20 the Court determined that warned
statements obtained directly after an interrogation in which
Miranda warnings were not given were not admissible.
Respondent’s son, Jonathon, who had cerebral palsy, died in his
sleep and respondent was afraid she would be charged with
neglect because he had bed sores.  In the presence of respon-
dent, respondent’s other sons devised a plan to incinerate
Jonathon’s body by burning down their mobile home, thus
destroying any evidence that might have been used to prove
neglect.  They decided to leave Donald Rector, a mentally ill
teenager living with the family, in the home when they started
the fire so it would not appear that Jonathon had been left unat-
tended.  Donald died in the fire.  Police officers questioned
respondent for about 30 to 40 minutes without issuing her
Miranda warnings.  After the police elicited inculpatory state-
ments, they gave respondent her Miranda warnings and ques-
tioned her again, receiving the same inculpatory responses.
This interrogation technique is taught at numerous police
academies nationwide and is referred to as “question-first.”
Spring 2004 - Court Review 33
17. 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
20. 124 S.Ct. 2601 (2004).
The Court also 
concluded . . . that
respondent’s age
and inexperience 
. . . should not be
considered in its
analysis.
                                               
Under this technique, officers
interrogate a person in succes-
sive unwarned and warned
phases, only providing
Miranda warnings after the
officers have elicited inculpa-
tory statements.  
Justice Souter, writing for a
plurality that included Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
determined that exclusion of
both the warned and
unwarned statements was nec-
essary under the Fifth
Amendment.  The plurality recognized that “[j]ust as ‘no talis-
manic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda’s] stric-
tures,’ . . . it would be absurd to think that mere recitation of
the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable cir-
cumstance.”  It concluded that “unless the warnings could
place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to
make such an informed choice, there is no practical justifica-
tion for accepting the formal warnings as compliant with
Miranda, or for treating the second stage of the interrogation as
distinct from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.”
Justice Breyer concurred, but believed the Court should
apply the “simple rule” and “exclude ‘fruits’ of the initial
unwarned questions unless the failure to warn was in good
faith.”  Justice Kennedy also concurred, concluding “[t]he
interrogation technique used in this case is designed to cir-
cumvent Miranda.”  However, he concluded that when the fail-
ure to warn is not “deliberate” and when “curative measures”
are taken, the second statements should be admissible.  Justice
O’Connor dissented on grounds that the Court specifically
rejected the subjective-based tests it applied in this case in
Oregon v. Elstad.21 In her view, since respondent’s statements
were voluntary, they were admissible.
The Court decided in United States v. Patane22 that Miranda
v. Arizona23 did not require the suppression of physical evi-
dence obtained in connection with unwarned but voluntary
statements.  In this case, two officers went to respondent’s
home to arrest respondent for violation of a restraining order.
One officer began to give respondent Miranda warnings but
was stopped by respondent before he finished.  Without com-
pleting the warnings, the officer, who had been tipped that
respondent illegally possessed a firearm, then questioned
respondent about the firearm.  Respondent eventually con-
fessed to having the firearm and permitted the officer to
retrieve it from the apartment.  Respondent sought to exclude
the firearm from evidence.
A three-justice plurality, in an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, determined that the fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine did not apply in these circumstances.  Fifth Amendment
prophylactic rules, like Miranda, sweep beyond the Self-
Incrimination Clause and, therefore, “any further extension of
these rules must be justified by its necessity for the protection
of the actual right against compelled self-incrimination.”
According to the plurality, “the Miranda rule ‘does not require
that the statements [taken without complying with the rule]
and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.’”  The plu-
rality made clear that “a mere failure to give Miranda warnings
does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or
even the Miranda rule.”  Instead, the “nature of the right pro-
tected” is a “fundamental trial right.”  This right only relates to
the exclusion of testimonial evidence.  Therefore, the plurality
concluded that it follows then that “police do not violate a sus-
pect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent
or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full
panoply of warning prescribed by Miranda.”  The violation
occurs “only upon the admission of unwarned statements into
evidence at trial.”
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred.  He
found it “unnecessary to decide whether the detective’s failure
to give respondent the full Miranda warning should be charac-
terized as a violation of the Miranda rule itself, or whether there
is ‘anything to deter’ so long as the unwarned statements are
not later introduced at trial.”  Instead, he relied on Oregon v.
Elstad,24 in which the Court held that evidence obtained fol-
lowing an unwarned interrogation was admissible.  Justice
Souter dissented, stating that the Court’s conclusion that “the
Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontes-
timonial evidence [is an] overstatement that is beside the
point.”  The issue was whether the application of the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine should be applied “lest we create an
incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings . . . before
custodial interrogation.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In Crawford v. Washington,25 the Court held the only indica-
tor of reliability that satisfies the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause is confrontation, meaning an out-of-
court statement by a witness is only admissible if (1) the wit-
ness is unavailable and (2) the accused had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.  Justice Scalia wrote for a seven-
person majority; Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O’Connor, filed a concurring opinion.  Petitioner was arrested
for assault and attempted murder and the State sought to intro-
duce at trial his wife’s tape-recorded statements previously
made to police during an interrogation.  The state could not
otherwise have her testify because of the state marital privilege,
“which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the
other spouse’s consent.”  The privilege does not apply, however,
to a spouse’s out-of-court statements admissible under a
hearsay exception.  To argue the tape-recorded statements were
admissible, Washington relied on Ohio v. Roberts,26 which held
that the constitutional right to confront witnesses “does not bar
admission of an unavailable witness’s statements against a crim-
inal defendant if the statement bears ‘adequate indicia of relia-
bility.’”  To meet this requirement, the evidence must either
34 Court Review - Spring 2004
21. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
22. 124 S.Ct. 2620 (2004).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
25. 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
26. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
In Crawford v.
Washington, the
Court held the
only indicator of
reliability that 
satisfies the . . .
Confrontation
Clause is 
confrontation . . . .
                                                     
“[1] fall within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or [2] bear
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’”  
The Sixth Amendment requires that “‘in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witness against him.’”  The Court previously deter-
mined in Roberts that this “bedrock procedural guarantee” was
safeguarded even if it allowed into evidence a witness’s out-of-
court statements “so long as it has adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity—i.e., falls within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’”  In this case,
however, the Court determined that Roberts was wrongly
decided.  To reach its conclusion, the Court turned to the his-
tory of the Sixth Amendment and concluded that it “supports
two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment:” (1)
“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and par-
ticularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused;” and (2) “that the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
The Court identified a “core class of ‘testimonial statements,’”
and concluded “interrogations by law enforcement officers fall
squarely within that class” of testimonial hearsay with which
the Sixth Amendment is concerned.  The Court also concluded
that the “text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any
open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to
be developed by the courts.”  The only exceptions to the
accused’s right to confront those witnesses against him are those
that existed at the “time of the founding.”  As history illustrates,
the admission of prior “examinations” is conditioned on
“unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”  
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, in
which he “dissent[ed] from the Court’s decision to overrule
[Roberts].”  He believed the Court’s distinction between testi-
monial and nontestimonial statements “is no better rooted in
history than our current doctrine.”  His own analysis of the his-
tory of the Sixth Amendment revealed that there existed a less
concrete common-law rule regarding confrontation.  He argued
that “[e]xceptions to confrontation have always been derived
from the experience that some out-of-court statements are just
as reliable as cross-examined in-court testimony due to the cir-
cumstances under which they were made.”  He would, how-
ever, reverse the judgment based on existing law.
In Blakely v. Washington,27 a 5-4 Court determined that a
court cannot impose an “exceptional” sentence that exceeds
the “ordinary” maximum sentence, but not the statutory max-
imum, based upon a judicial determination of aggravating fac-
tors.  Petitioner reached a plea agreement with respect to
charges for second-degree kidnapping, involving domestic vio-
lence and use of a firearm.  During sentencing, the judge, pur-
suant to Washington law, imposed a sentence of 90 months,
which was above the “standard range” of 59 to 53 months,
upon finding “‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an
exceptional sentence.”  The sentence, however, still fell within
the statutory maximum of ten
years.  The findings upon
which the judge relied to sup-
port the “exceptional sen-
tence” were not those used to
support the underlying sen-
tence.  
Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, determined that
the imposition of the
enhanced sentence violated
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury as set
forth in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.28 Apprendi states that
“[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.’”  In Ring v. Arizona,29 the Court extended
Apprendi to capital sentencing.  As in Apprendi, the Court con-
cluded that “the defendant’s constitutional rights had been vio-
lated because the judge had imposed a sentence greater than
the maximum he could have imposed under state law without
the challenged factual finding.”  In Blakely, the Court extended
Apprendi to circumstances where a judge has found aggravating
factors and imposed a sentence above the “standard range,”
even though it still falls within statutory maximum.  In
response to the dissents, the Court said why it followed
Apprendi: “Our commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects
not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to
give intelligible content to the right of jury trial.”  Under the
constitution, “a jury trial is meant to ensure [the people’s] con-
trol of the judiciary.”  The Court’s rule in Apprendi “carries out
this design by ensuring that the judge’s authority to sentence
derives wholly from the jury’s verdict.”
Justice O’Connor dissented, focusing most of her opinion on
the perceived  ill-effects of the decision.  She concluded: “What
I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sen-
tencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of crimi-
nal judgments are in jeopardy.”  Justice Kennedy agreed, but
wrote to add one more criticism: “The Court . . . disregards the
fundamental principle under our constitutional system that dif-
ferent branches of government ‘converse with each other on
matters of vital common interest.’”  Sentencing guidelines are
one example where case-by-case judicial determinations have
been “refined by legislature and codified into statutes or rules
as general standards.”  Because of the Court’s decision,
“[n]umerous States that have enacted sentencing guidelines
similar to the one in Washington State are now commanded to
scrap everything and start over.”  Justice Breyer, also dissenting,
categorized Apprendi as an “impulse,” easily understood as the
Court’s attempt to control widely disparate sentences.  He
wrote that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury
trial is for “fairness and effectiveness of a sentencing system.”
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In his view, however, the
Court’s Blakely decision  “pre-
vents the legislature from
seeking sentencing systems
that are consistent with, and
indeed may help to advance,
the Constitution’s greater fair-
ness goals.”
In Fellers v. United States,30
Justice O’Connor, writing for a
unanimous Court, held that
statements “deliberately
elicited” by police officers after an individual has been indicted
by a grand jury violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel;
therefore, any fruits analysis must be conducted under the
Sixth Amendment as opposed to the Fifth Amendment.  Fellers
was indicted by a grand jury.  When police officers went to
Fellers’s home to arrest him, they questioned him prior to
advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona31 and
Patterson v. Illinois,32 the latter having extended Miranda to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Petitioner made inculpa-
tory statements, which were repeated later at the jailhouse after
he received the proper warnings.  He sought to exclude all the
statements from evidence.  
The Court began its opinion by stating that Fellers’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was triggered when the grand jury
issued the indictment.  Under the Sixth Amendment, to deter-
mine whether the right to counsel has been violated, the Court
“consistently applie[s] the deliberate-elicitation standard.”  In
this case, it concluded that the statements taken from Fellers at
his home were “deliberately elicited” and, therefore, obtained
in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.  Furthermore, as to
the jailhouse statements, the Court concluded that a fruits
analysis should not be conducted under the Fifth Amendment.
In Oregon v. Elstad,33 the Court determined that “‘[t]hough
Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be sup-
pressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should
turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly
and voluntarily made.’”  However, the Court has not yet deter-
mined “whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect
makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police
questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards.”
Therefore, it remanded the case to allow the lower courts “to
address this issue in the first instance.”
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court in Iowa v. Tovar,34 which held that the Sixth Amendment
does not require a trial court to admonish the defendant, before
accepting a guilty plea, that by waiving counsel (1) defendant
will not obtain an independent opinion whether it is wise to
plead guilty and (2) defendant risks overlooking a viable
defense; the Sixth Amendment only requires that waiver of
counsel be knowing and intelligent and during pretrial pro-
ceedings the warnings required to meet that standard are less
rigorous than if an accused is waiving his right to trial counsel.
Tovar was arrested numerous times for operating a motor vehi-
cle while under the influence of alcohol.  Under Iowa law, his
last and third offense was a “class ‘D’ felon[y].”  Tovar argued
his first OWI “could not be used to enhance the December
2000 OWI charge from the second-offense aggravated misde-
meanor to a third-offense felony”  because “his 1996 waiver of
counsel was invalid—not ‘full knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary’—because he was ‘never made aware by the court . . . of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’”  The trial
court conducted a “guilty plea colloquy” as required by Iowa
criminal procedure.  The Iowa Supreme Court, however, deter-
mined that the following elements were also necessary to sat-
isfy the Sixth Amendment: (1) “‘that there are defenses to crim-
inal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the
danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether
to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be over-
looked;’” (2) that the defendant “‘will lose the opportunity to
obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and
applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty;’” and (3) “‘the defen-
dant understands the nature of the charges against him and the
range of allowable punishments.’”  While the trial court cov-
ered the last point, it did not warn Tovar about the first two.  
The Court determined that the specific warnings set forth by
the Iowa Supreme Court were not necessary.  While a plea hear-
ing qualifies as a “critical stage” in the criminal process, trig-
gering the Sixth Amendment, the Court has not previously
“prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who
states that he elects to proceed without counsel.”  Instead, it
only requires that waiver of counsel be intelligent, i.e., the
“‘choice is made with eyes open.’”  Therefore, while a trial
court’s warning for waiver of trial counsel “must be
‘rigorous[ly]’ conveyed,”  “at the earlier stages of the criminal
process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice.”  The
Court concluded that in this case, “Iowa’s plea colloquy suffices
both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure
that his guilty plea is informed and voluntary.”  The Court also
determined that in order to decide this case, it need not
“endorse the State’s position that nothing more than the plea
colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar’s right to counsel.”
The question is narrower: “‘Does the Sixth Amendment require
a court to give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se
defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an attorney, that
an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is
wise to plead guilty and that without an attorney the defendant
risks overlooking a defense?’”  The Court answered the ques-
tion in the negative and concluded that these two specific
admonishments were not required by the Sixth Amendment.
CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Justice Souter delivered the eight-justice majority opinion in
United States v. Dominguez Benitez,35 which held that “a defen-
dant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on
the ground that the district court committed plain error under
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Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, he would not have entered the plea.”  After lengthy nego-
tiations, respondent entered into a plea agreement regarding
charges of possession and conspiracy to possess methamphet-
amine.  As part of the plea, it was also agreed that the govern-
ment would stipulate that respondent “would receive what is
known as a safety-valve reduction of two levels.”  When
accepting the plea, the District Court gave most of the warn-
ings under Rule 11, but “failed to mention that [respondent]
could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the
Government’s recommendations.”  However, this admonition
was set forth in the written plea agreement.  It was later dis-
covered that respondent was not eligible for the safety valve
and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum.  Respondent
appealed, claiming “that the District Court’s failure to warn
him, as Rule 11(c)(3)(B) instructs, that he could not withdraw
his guilty plea if the court did not accept the Government’s rec-
ommendations, required reversal.”  The Court disagreed.
Although Rule 11 requires a court to instruct a defendant that
he may not withdraw his guilty plea if the court does not
except the government’s recommendation, it also instructs that
“not every violation of its terms call for reversal of conviction
by entitling the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.”  The
Court, in United States v. Vonn,36 “considered the standard that
applies when a defendant is dilatory in raising Rule 11 error,
and held that reversal is not in order unless the error is plain.”
The Court did not, however, “formulate the standard for deter-
mining whether a defendant has shown, as the plain-error
standard requires . . . an effect on his substantial rights.”   In
this case, the Court concluded that a prejudicial standard
applies, relying on three reasons: (1) “the standard should
enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to
encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by
demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved
error;” (2) the standard “should respect the particular impor-
tance of the finality of guilty pleas;” and (3) at least in this
case, “the reasons are contemplated by the fact, worth repeat-
ing, that the violation claimed was of Rule 11, not due
process.”
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but wrote sepa-
rately because he disagrees that “respondent need not show
prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.”  He writes,
“this Court has adopted no fewer than four assertedly different
standards of probability relating to the assessment of whether
the outcome of trial would have been different if error had not
occurred, or if omitted evidence had been included.”  Justice
Scalia believed the only “serviceable standards are the tradi-
tional ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘more likely than not.’”  
In Sabri v. United States,37 Justice Souter delivered the opin-
ion of the Court, which held that Congress had the power to
enact a federal bribery law, which provides criminal penalties
for anyone who attempts to bribe or bribes a state or local offi-
cial of an entity receiving federal funding, under the Necessary
and Proper Clause of Article I of the Constitution.  Justice
Souter was joined in full by six justices, with Justices Scalia
and Kennedy concurring in
the judgment and in part.
Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment.  18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 666(a)(2) imposes federal
criminal penalties for anyone
who bribes an individual if
that individual is part of an
organization, government, or
agency that receives, in any
one-year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 from the federal
government.  Petitioner was convicted for offering three sepa-
rate bribes to a city councilman, Brian Herron, who also served
as a member on the Board of Commissioners for the
Minneapolis Community Development Agency, in connection
with a real estate development project.  Petitioner challenged
his indictment on the grounds “that [section] 666(a)(2) is
unconstitutional on its face for failure to require proof of a
connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe, as
an element of liability.”
The Court concluded that Article I power does not require
proof of a connection between federal money as an element of
the offense.  Under Article I, Congress has the power under the
Spending Clause to “appropriate federal monies to promote
the general welfare.”  Under its corresponding authority in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the power “to see
to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in
fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in
graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off
or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value
for dollars.”  According to the Court, section 666(a)(2)
“addresses these problems at the sources of bribes, by rational
means, to safeguard the integrity of the state, local, and tribal
recipients of federal dollars.”  The Court recognized that not
every bribe covered by section 666(a)(2) will be traceable from
federal funds or constitute a quid pro quo for some dereliction
in spending of a federal grant.  However, “this possibility por-
tends no enforcement beyond the scope of federal interest, for
the reason that corruption does not have to be that limited to
affect the federal interest.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Justice Breyer, joined by seven other justices, delivered the
opinion of the Court in Castro v. United States,38 resolving a
split among the circuits.  It held that a court cannot recharac-
terize a pro se litigant’s motion as the litigant’s first motion
under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 unless the court: (1) informs the
litigant of its intent to recharacterize the motion; (2) warns the
litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent sec-
tion 2255 motions to the law’s “second or successive” restric-
tions; and (3) provides a litigant with the opportunity to with-
draw or amend the filing.  In 1994, petitioner filed a motion
with the district court, which he classified as a Rule 33 motion.
In its decision, the district court referred to the motion as both
a Rule 33 and a section 2255 motion.  The Eleventh Circuit
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affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the motion.  In
1997, petitioner filed a section
2255 motion and the govern-
ment sought to have it dis-
missed on the ground that
petitioner had failed to com-
ply with section 2255’s restric-
tive “second or successive”
conditions.  The Court deter-
mined that the 1997 motion
was not a “second or succes-
sive” motion because the 1994 was not properly reclassified as
a second 2255 motion.  The Court recognized that courts may
sometimes recharacterize pro se motions, but when a court
decides to recharacterize a motion as a section 2255 motion,
because of section 2255’s restrictions, it must give the warn-
ings set forth above.  The Court noted that even the govern-
ment suggested that the Court has the power to create such a
rule based on the following grounds: (1) under the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 47, (2) under its authority to
“regulate the practice through ‘the exercise’ of our ‘supervisory
powers’ over the federal judiciary,” and (3) because it “is likely
to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characteri-
zation, which are often quite difficult.”  
Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring in the judgment
and in only the first two parts of the majority’s opinion.  He
disagreed with “the Court’s laissez-faire attitude toward rechar-
acterization.”  He believed the Court had erred by promulgat-
ing a new rule without placing limitations on when recharac-
terization can occur, including the fact that the Court has
failed to provide a pro se litigant the opportunity “to insist that
the district court rule on his motion as filed.”  He argued that
when, as here, there is nothing to be gained by recharacteriza-
tion, a district court should not be allowed to recharacterize a
motion.  In this case, Castro’s Rule 33 motion was “valid as a
procedural manner, and the claim it raised was no weaker on
the merits when presented under Rule 33 than when presented
under [section] 2255.”  Therefore, the recharacterization was
improper.
In Pliler v. Ford,39 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of
the Court, which held that a district court is not required to
issue the following warnings to a pro se habeas petitioner: (1)
the court can stay the petitioner’s motion only if he chooses to
dismiss the unexhausted claims from a mixed petition and (2)
that the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) will bar refiling of
the petition if he dismissed the action to exhaust the non-
exhausted claims.  Respondent filed two pro se federal peti-
tions for habeas corpus five days before the statute of limita-
tions ran under the AEDPA.  Some of the claims in each of the
petitions had not been exhausted in state court.  The district
court gave petitioner three options: (1) the petitions could be
dismissed without prejudice and respondent could refile after
exhausting the unexhausted claims; (2) the unexhausted
claims could be dismissed and respondent could proceed with
only the exhausted claims; or (3) respondent could contest the
magistrate judge’s finding that some of the claims had not been
exhausted.  Respondent chose to exhaust his nonexhausted
claims.  When he sought to refile after exhausting his non-
exhausted claims, his petitions were dismissed because the
one-year statute of limitations had run.  
Under Rose v. Lundy,40 “federal district courts must dismiss
mixed habeas petitions.”  To avoid statute of limitations prob-
lems, the Ninth Circuit had adopted the “stay-and-abeyance”
procedure, which involves three steps: (1) “the dismissal of
any unexhausted claims from the original mixed petition,” (2)
“a stay of the remaining claims, pending exhaustion of the dis-
missed unexhausted claims in state court,” and (3) “amend-
ment of the original petition to add the newly exhausted claims
that then relate back to the original petition.”  In this case, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court was required to
advise respondent that it could only consider petitioner’s stay
motions if petitioner dismissed the nonexhausted claims and
then “renewed the prematurely filed stay motions.”  It also
concluded that the district court committed prejudicial error
by failing to inform respondent that the one-year statute of
limitations had run. The Court, without addressing the Ninth
Circuit’s stay-and-abeyance procedures, determined that a dis-
trict court is not required to give the warnings set forth by the
Ninth Circuit.  Rose only requires that the district court dis-
miss mixed petitions, which results, of course, in the prisoner
being obligated to follow one of the two paths.  However, noth-
ing in Rose obligates that these “options be equally attractive,
much less suggests that district court give specific advisements
as to the availability and wisdom of these options.”
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in
Banks v. Dretke,41 which held that discovery and an evidentiary
hearing is authorized in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
when the state has concealed exculpatory or impeaching evi-
dence and the petitioner has met the requirement of Brady v.
Maryland.42 Furthermore, the Court concluded, in a pre-
AEDPA habeas proceeding, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure applies and the state may waive by its actions
procedural default and exhaustion remedies.  Petitioner was
convicted of first-degree murder.  The prosecution used the
testimony of a paid police informant, Robert Farr, in both its
case-in-chief and in the penalty phase of the trial, without dis-
closing the fact that Farr was a paid police informant, although
that information was requested and the state indicated that it
would disclose all necessary information.  The prosecution
also used the testimony of another witness, Charles Cook, in
its case-in-chief, who stated many times on cross-examination
that he had not “talked to anyone about his testimony.”  This
was a misrepresentation that was not corrected by the prose-
cution.  In 1996, Banks filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, asserting: (1) “that the State had withheld material excul-
patory evidence ‘revealing Robert Farr as a police informant
and Mr. Banks’ arrest as a set-up” (“Farr Brady claim”); and (2)
“that the State had concealed ‘Cook’s enormous incentive to
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testify in a manner favorable to the [prosecution]’” (“Cook
Brady claim”). In June 1998, “Banks moved for discovery and
an evidentiary hearing to gain information from the State on
the roles played and trial testimony provided by Farr and
Cook.”  The magistrate judge allowed limited discovery for
Cook, but denied it as to Farr, stating Banks had not provided
sufficient justification.  In 1999, Banks renewed his request for
discovery and an evidentiary hearing, “[t]his time, . . . [prof-
fering] affidavits from both Farr and Cook to back up his
claims that, as to each of these two key witnesses, the prose-
cution had wrongly withheld crucial exculpatory and
impeaching evidence.”  The magistrate judge then ordered dis-
covery and, for the first time, two things were disclosed: (1)
Cook had been extensively coached prior to his testimony at
Banks’s trial and (2) “that Farr was an informant and that he
had been paid $200 for his involvement in the case.”
In the first part of its opinion, the Court addressed Banks’s
Farr Brady claim.  The Court determined that Banks had
exhausted his state remedies because his state-court applica-
tion alleged “the prosecution knowingly failed to turn over
exculpatory evidence involving Farr in violation of Banks’s due
process rights.”  However, because Banks failed to produce any
evidence to support his claim, he must “show cause for his fail-
ure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings and actual
prejudice resulting from that failure.”  In Strickler v. Greene,43
the Court set forth the three essential elements to establish a
Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: (1) the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory or is impeaching, (2) the “evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently,”
and (3) “prejudice must have ensued.”  The Court said that
“‘[c]ause and prejudice’ in this case ‘parallels two of the three
components of the alleged Brady violation itself.’”  It also con-
cluded that Banks satisfies the three requirements.  First, the
suppressed evidence “qualifies as evidence advantageous to
Banks.”  As to “cause,” the Court determined that “Banks’s fail-
ure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings is informed
by Strickler.”  In Strickler, as in this case, the prosecutor told
the defense it would open the state files and there was no need
for a formal Brady motion.  However, the file was missing sev-
eral important documents.  In Strickler, the Court determined
that the “petitioner has shown cause for his failure to raise a
Brady claim in state court,” relying on three factors: (1) “‘the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence;’” (2) petitioner
reasonably relied on the prosecution’s “open-file” policy; and
(3) “‘the [State] confirmed petitioner’s reliance on the open-file
policy by asserting during state habeas proceedings that peti-
tioner had already received everything known to the govern-
ment.’”  The Court concluded that this case was “congruent
with Strickler in all three respects.” 
In the second part of the opinion, the Court addressed
Banks’s Cook Brady claim.  The Fifth Circuit determined that
Banks had failed to develop the facts underpinning the claim
in his 1992 state petition, making the evidentiary hearing
ordered by the magistrate judge unwarranted.  It denied the
certificate of appealability “apparently” because it regarded
Rule 15(b) as inapplicable in a
federal habeas proceeding.  Rule
15 states in part that “when
issues not raised by the plead-
ings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings.”  The
Court states that “[w]e have
twice before referenced Rule
15(b)’s application in federal
habeas proceedings,” and have concluded that it applies.  In
this case, there is no “reason why an evidentiary hearing
should not qualify [for Rule 15(b) purposes] so long as the
respondent gave ‘any sort of consent’ and has a full and fair
‘opportunity to present evidence bearing on the claim’s resolu-
tion.’”  The Court did not believe, as the Fifth Circuit cau-
tioned, that such a rule would “undermine the State’s exhaus-
tion and procedural default defenses.”  Pre-AEDPA, “there was
no inconsistency between Rule 15(b) and those defenses”
because “exhaustion and procedural default defenses could be
waived based on the State’s litigation conduct.”  Because Banks
could have “‘demonstrate[d] that jurists of reason could dis-
agree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” the
Court concluded a certificate of appealability should have
issued.
In an 8-1 decision, the Court, in Baldwin v. Reese,44 held that
a state prisoner does not satisfy the “fair presentation” require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. section 2254 when a state court must read
beyond the petition, brief, or other papers to be alerted to the
federal nature of the claims.  Respondent’s petition for review
in the Oregon Supreme Court did not allege “his separate
appellate ‘ineffective assistance’ claim violated federal law.”
After review was denied, respondent brought a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising the claim.  The
district court dismissed the claim because respondent had
failed to “fairly present” it in highest state court.  A divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that Reese had
fairly presented the claim because the Oregon Supreme Court
“had ‘the opportunity to read . . . the lower court decision
claimed to be in error before deciding whether to grant discre-
tionary review.’”  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
reversed.  The Court held that “to say that a petitioner ‘fairly
presents’ a federal claim only by reading lower court opinions
in the case is to say that those judges must read the lower court
opinions—for otherwise they would forfeit the State’s oppor-
tunity to decide that federal claim in the first instance.”
Federal habeas law does not impose such a requirement.  The
Court also concluded that the federal claim was not “fairly pre-
sented” because the state and federal claims were virtually
identical.  
Justice Stevens, dissenting, said “[i]t is appropriate to disre-
gard this Court’s Rule 15.2 and permit respondents to defend a
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judgment on grounds not
raised in the brief in opposi-
tion when the omitted issue
is ‘predicate to an intelligent
resolution of the question
presented.’”  In this
instance, he would consider
Reese’s last argument and,
since there is “no significant
difference between” the
state and federal claims,
find that “the state courts
did have a fair opportunity to assess [Reese’s] federal claim.”
In Dretke v. Haley,45 a 6-3 Court determined that when faced
with a claim of actual innocence, whether of a sentence or a
crime charged, a court must first address all non-defaulted
claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to
excuse the procedural default.  Respondent was convicted of
theft and under a habitual offender statute, even though he did
not meet the elements necessary for the habitual offender
statute.  Respondent did not, however, challenge his convic-
tion based on actual innocence until his petition for habeas
relief in state court.  The state court denied his claim because
it was not raised on direct appeal, but on federal habeas review,
the Fifth Circuit reversed, “holding narrowly that the actual
innocence exception ‘applies to noncapital sentencing proce-
dures involving a career offender or habitual felony offender.’”  
The Court has recognized “an equitable exception to the bar
when a habeas applicant can demonstrate cause and prejudice
for the procedural default.”  Because the “cause and prejudice”
standard is not a “perfect safeguard,” the Court, in Murray v.
Carrier,46 recognized “a narrow exception to the cause require-
ment where a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in
the conviction of one who is ‘actually innocent’ of the sub-
stantive offense.”  Sawyer v. Whitley47 extended this exception
to capital sentencing errors.  In the case before it, the Court
declined to extend this “narrow exception” to noncapital sen-
tencing, stating “that a federal court faced with allegations of
actual innocence, whether of the sentence or of the crime
charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for compa-
rable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse procedural
default.”  The Court finds that this avoidance principal was
“implicit” in Carrier.  In this case, Petitioner “has conceded
. . . that respondent has a viable and ‘significant’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.”  Therefore, this claim should be
addressed first.    
Justice Stevens dissented, finding that “[t]he unending
search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget
about justice.”  In his view, this was a simple case: “because the
constitutional error clearly and concededly resulted in the
imposition of an unauthorized sentence, it also follows that
respondent is a ‘victim of a miscarriage of justice.’”  Justice
Kennedy, in his own dissenting opinion, added that “[t]he case
also merits this further comment concerning the larger obliga-
tion of state or federal officials when they know an individual
has been sentenced for a crime he did not commit.”  He
believed the state should have taken steps to “vindicate” these
interests in the first place and not attempt to keep Haley incar-
cerated for a crime he did not commit.
In a 6-3 decision, written by Justice O’Connor, the Court, in
Tennard v. Dretke,48 held that the only question to be answered
in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is
whether a reasonable juror could find the determination of the
district court debatable or wrong; a petitioner need not make a
threshold showing that he suffered from a “uniquely severe
permanent handicap” or show a nexus between his impaired
intellectual functioning and the crime committed to satisfy
Penre I and obtain a certificate of appealability. Petitioner was
convicted by a jury of capital murder in 1986.  During the
penalty phase of the trial, defense introduced evidence of
Tennard’s low IQ, which the prosecution argued was irrelevant.
Tennard sought post-conviction relief, arguing that in light of
the instructions given to the jury, his death sentence “had been
obtained in violation of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted
by this Court in Penry I.”  In Penry v. Lynaugh,49 the Court held,
in invalidating the very same instructions that were given to
Tennard’s jury, that it was not enough to give mitigating evi-
dence to the sentencer, “‘[t]he sentencer must also be able to
consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sen-
tence.’”   The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
Tennard was not entitled to a certificate of appealability for two
reasons: (1) “evidence of low IQ alone does not constitute a
uniquely severe condition,” and (2) “even if Tennard’s evi-
dence was mental retardation evidence, his claim must fail
because he did not show that the crime he committed was
attributable to his low IQ.”  In reversing and remanding, the
Court determined the Fifth Circuit “invoked its own restrictive
gloss on Penry I”: “Neither Penry I nor its progeny screened
mitigating evidence for ‘constitutional relevance’ before con-
sidering whether the jury instructions comported with the
Eighth Amendment.”  The proper analysis of Tennard’s claim
asks whether “Tennard [has] ‘demonstrate[d] that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the consti-
tutional claims debatable or wrong?’”  The Court concluded
that reasonable jurists could conclude that low IQ was relevant
mitigating evidence and that “the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals’ application of Penry to the facts of Tennard’s case was
unreasonable.”  The Court concluded that “[i]mpaired intel-
lectual functioning has mitigating dimensions beyond the
impact it has on the individual’s ability to act deliberately.”
HABEAS CORPUS – NEW RULES
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of a 5-4 Court in
Beard v. Banks.50 It held the Court’s decision in Mills v.
Maryland,51 which forbids a state from imposing a requirement
of unanimity before a mitigating factor can be considered in a
40 Court Review - Spring 2004
Justice Stevens
dissented, finding
that “[t]he unending
search for 
symmetry in the
law can cause
judges to forget
about justice.”
                                  
52. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
53. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
54. 124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004).
55. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
56. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
57. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
58. 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
59. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
sentencing decision, does not apply retroactively.  Respondent
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death prior to the
Court’s decision in Mills.  Under Teague v. Lane,52 to determine
whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies to
a case on collateral review, a court must: (1) “determine when
the defendant’s conviction became final;” (2) “ascertain the
‘legal landscape’ as it then existed,” and (3) “ask whether the
Constitution, as interpreted by the precedent then existing,
compels the rule.”  As to the last step, the court essentially
must determine whether the rule is “new.”  If it is “new,” the
court must consider “whether it falls within either of the two
exceptions to nonretroactivity.”  Teague’s bar on retroactivity
does not apply if: (1) it is a rule “forbidding punishment ‘of
certain primary conduct [or . . . ] . . . prohibiting a certain cat-
egory of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense,’” or (2) it is a “‘watershed rule of criminal
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the criminal proceedings.’”  The Court concluded that it was
clear that respondent’s conviction became final prior to its
decision in Mills.  It also concluded that the rule announced in
Mills was new, finding that existing precedent, i.e., Lockett v.
Ohio,53 and its progeny, did not mandate the rule in Mills.
Because the Court summarily concluded that the first non-
retroactive exception in Teague did not apply, it only discusses
the second, stating that it has “repeatedly emphasized the lim-
ited scope of the second Teague exception, explaining that ‘it is
clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring
some observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in
the concept of orderly liberty.’”  The Court has yet to find a rule
that falls within this exception and found that the Mills rule
not to be the first one.  While recognizing that Mills helps
avoid the “potentially arbitrary impositions of the death sen-
tence,” “the fact that a new rule removes some remote possi-
bility of arbitrary infliction of the death sentence does not suf-
fice to bring it within Teague’s second exception.”  However
laudable, “‘it has none of the primacy and centrality” necessary
for it to fall under the exception.
In Schriro v. Summerlin,54 a 5-4 Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Scalia, determined that its decision in Ring v.
Arizona,55 which requires a jury determine the existence of
aggravating factors used to impose a death sentence, was a pro-
cedural rule, but not a “watershed rule of criminal procedure”
that requires retroactive application.  While respondent’s case
was pending on federal habeas review, the Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersey,56 which “interpreted the constitutional
due-process and jury-trial guarantees to require that, ‘[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt,’” and Ring, which applied Apprendi’s rule to a death sen-
tence.  Respondent challenged his death sentence by arguing
that the judge, not the jury, found the existence of aggravating
factors.  The Court determined that the rule announced in Ring
was procedural and, therefore, the rules regarding retroactive
application as expressed in Teague v. Lane apply.57 It does not,
however, believe Ring announced a “watershed rule of criminal
procedure,” thereby falling into one of the exceptions for
retroactive application.  The purpose behind Ring was the
Court’s determination that it is the jury’s, and not the judge’s,
role to decide whether aggravating factors exist.  However,
there is no unequivocal evidence to suggest that a judge is a
less accurate factfinder than a jury, meaning that a determina-
tion by a judge carries an “’impermissibly large risk’” of pun-
ishing conduct the law does not reach.  The Court turned to its
decision in DeStefano v. Woods58 for support.  In DeStefano, the
Court “refused to give retroactive effect to Duncan v.
Louisiana,59 which applied the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial
guarantee to the States.”  The Court here said that in deciding
DeStefano, it had determined “that, although ‘the right to jury
trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and repression[,]
. . . [w]e would not assert . . . that every criminal trial—or any
particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a
defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would
a jury.’”
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